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BORROWING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH:
ANOTHER LOOK AT PROBATE LENDING
DAVID HORTON*
ABSTRACT
“Fringe” lending has long been controversial. Three decades ago,
demand for subprime credit soared, and businesses started to offer
high-interest rate cash advances, such as tax refund anticipation
loans, payday loans, and pension loans. These products have sparked
intense debate and are subject to a maze of rules.
However, in Probate Lending, published in the Yale Law Journal,
a coauthor and I examined a form of fringe lending that has gone
largely unnoticed: firms that pay lump sums in return for an heir or
beneficiary’s interest in a pending decedent’s estate. Capitalizing on
a California law that requires companies to file these contracts in
probate court, we analyzed seventy-seven loans that stemmed from
deaths in 2007.
In this companion Article, I report the results of a study of two ad-
ditional twenty-two months of probate records. My research provides
hard evidence about the multimillion dollar inheritance-buying
industry, including the prevalence of loans, characteristics of
borrowers, how often lenders are repaid, and annual interest rates.
I then use this data to compare probate lending to other species of
fringe lending and to outline how courts and lawmakers should
regulate the practice.
* Professor of Law and Chancellor’s Fellow, University of California, Davis, School of
Law. Thanks to Andrea Cann Chandrasekher and Reid Kress Weisbord for helpful comments.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, a woman named Carolyn Chubbuck signed a tidy holo-
graphic will that divided her assets among her surviving descen-
dants.1 A year later, she died, leaving three daughters, Kristina (age
twenty-eight), Stefani (age twenty-one), and Jamie (age twenty).2
Her estate began the probate process in Hayward, California.3
But then something happened that altered the distribution of
Carolyn’s property. Kristina assigned $23,100 of her expected inher-
itance to an entity called Heir Advance Company, Inc. (HAC) in re-
turn for an immediate payment of $15,000.4 Just thirteen days later,
Kristina traded an additional $38,500 of her mother’s legacy to HAC
for a lump sum of $25,000.5 As the probate case continued, Kristina
borrowed eight more times, surrendering a total of $173,510 of in-
heritance rights and collecting $116,480.6 Likewise, Stefani exe-
cuted seven agreements, selling a $144,080 share of the estate for
1. See Petition for Prob. of Will & for Letters Testamentary, Holographic Will at 1-2, In
re Estate of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 28, 2009) (DomainWeb).
2. Id. Petition at 4.
3. Id. at 1.
4. See Agreement of Kristina M. Chubbuck at 1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No. HP
09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2009) (DomainWeb).
5. See Agreement of Kristina M. Chubbuck for Second Assignment at 1, In re Estate of
Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 23, 2009) (DomainWeb).
6. See Sixth Agreement of Kristina M. Chubbuck at 1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No.
HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 15, 2013) (DomainWeb); Agreement of Kristina M.
Chubbuck for Fifth Assignment at 1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Aug. 5, 2011) (DomainWeb); Agreement of Kristina M. Chubbuck for Fourth Assignment
at 1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2011) (DomainWeb);
Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate/Waiver
of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5; Proof of Serv. at
1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 2010) (DomainWeb);
Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate/Waiver
of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5; Proof of Serv. at
1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2010); Assignment
Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer
Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5; Proof of Serv. at 1, In re Estate
of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 23, 2010) (DomainWeb); Assignment
Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer
Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5; Proof of Serv. at 1, In re Estate
of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 15, 2010) (DomainWeb); Agreement of
Kristina M. Chubbuck for Third Assignment at 1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847
(Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 2010) (DomainWeb).
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$97,440,7 and Jamie signed eleven contracts, relinquishing $131,670
and receiving $78,500.8 The final such transaction, in which
7. See Stefani L. Chubbuck’s Assignment #6, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in
Decedent’s Estate to Inheritance Funding Co., Inc. at 1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No.
HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 21, 2011) (DomainWeb); Stefani L. Chubbuck’s Assignment
#5, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate to Inheritance Funding Co.,
Inc. at 1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 26, 2011)
(DomainWeb); Stefani L. Chubbuck’s Assignment #3, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest
in Decedent’s Estate to Inheritance Funding Co., Inc. at 1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No.
HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 2011) (DomainWeb); Stefani L. Chubbuck’s Assignment
#3, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate to Inheritance Funding Co.,
Inc. at 1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2011)
(DomainWeb); Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5;
Proof of Serv. at 1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2011)
(DomainWeb); Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5;
Proof of Serv. at 1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2010)
(DomainWeb); Agreement of Stefani Lea Chubbuck at 1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No.
HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 23, 2009) (DomainWeb).
8. See Jamie Chubbuck’s Assignment #9, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in
Decedent’s Estate to Inheritance Funding Co., Inc. at 1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No.
HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2013) (DomainWeb); Jamie Chubbuck’s Assignment #8,
Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate to Inheritance Funding Co., Inc.
at 1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012) (DomainWeb);
Jamie Chubbuck’s Assignment #7, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate
to Inheritance Funding Co., Inc. at 1, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super.
Ct. July 9, 2012) (DomainWeb); Jamie Chubbuck’s Assignment #6, Sale & Transfer of
Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate to Inheritance Funding Co., Inc. at 1, In re Estate of
Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 2011) (DomainWeb); Assignment
Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer
Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5; Proof of Serv. at 1, In re Estate
of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 2011) (DomainWeb); Assignment
Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer
Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5; Proof of Serv. at 1, In re Estate
of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 2010) (DomainWeb); Assignment
Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer
Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5; Proof of Serv. at 1, In re Estate
of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2010) (DomainWeb); Assignment
Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer
Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5; Proof of Serv. at 1, In re Estate
of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2010) (DomainWeb); Assignment
Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer
Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5; Proof of Serv. at 1, In re Estate
of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 2, 2010); Agreement of Jamie L.
Chubbuck for Second Assignment at 1, In re Estate of Chubbuck at 1, No. HP09454847 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 2010); Agreement of Jamie L. Chubbuck, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No.
HP09454847 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2010) (DomainWeb).
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Kristina sold a $7500 cut of the estate for $5000, occurred just
twenty days before the court granted the petition for final distribu-
tion and the lenders were repaid.9 If it had been a conventional loan,
its annual percentage rate (APR) would have been 913 percent.
Carolyn Chubbuck’s estate offers a glimpse into a blind spot in a
divisive industry. For decades, there has been fierce debate over so-
called “fringe” lending.10 Traditionally, usury laws capped APRs at
around 10 percent,11 and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) required
creditors to conspicuously disclose their loans’ key terms.12 But near
the end of the twentieth century, businesses designed several cash
advance products that attempted to slip between the cracks of or-
thodox consumer protection regulation. These alternative forms of
finance—including tax refund anticipation loans,13 payday loans,14
and pension loans15—have received sustained attention from
9. See Sixth Agreement of Kristina M. Chubbuck, supra note 6, at 1; see also Judgment
Settling First & Final Account & Report of Admin. Ordering Final Distribution, Comp. for
Servs. Rendered & Reimbursement of Costs at 8, In re Estate of Chubbuck, No. HP09454847
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 4, 2013) (DomainWeb).
10. See generally JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWN-
SHOPS, AND THE POOR 12-64 (1994) (detailing the history of “fringe” banking and its con-
temporary impacts). 
11. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1(1); see also infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
12. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1608, 1631-1635, 1637-1651, 1661-1667f (2012) (“It is the
purpose of [the TILA] to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer
will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the
uninformed use of credit.”).
13. See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 166-77 (2004);
Leslie Book, Refund Anticipation Loans and the Tax Gap, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 85, 99-
104 (2009); Danshera Cords, Paid Tax Preparers, Used Car Dealers, Refund Anticipation
Loans, and the Earned Income Tax Credit: The Need to Regulate Tax Return Preparers and
Provide More Free Alternatives, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 351, 377-81 (2009); Lynn Drysdale
& Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe
Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in
Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 612-13, 644-46 (2000).
14. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 44-45, 55-56 (2008); Richard R.W. Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 1006-
09 (2006); Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 9-12 (2002); Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV.
855, 857-61 (2007); Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight
of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1123-
28 (2008); Pearl Chin, Note, Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation, 2004 U. ILL. L.
REV. 723, 724-26; see also Bethany McLean, Payday Lending: Will Anything Better Replace
It?, ATLANTIC (May 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/05/payday-
lending/476403 [https://perma.cc/NPX6-ZTV2].
15. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-420, PENSION ADVANCE TRANS-
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litigants, academics, journalists, and advocacy groups.16 Recently,
Congress, agencies, and state legislatures have taken aggressive
steps to regulate them.17
Conversely, inheritance-buying firms like HAC have flown be-
neath the radar. Until recently, a grand total of one magazine
article and two newspaper columns had mentioned the practice.18
Even more remarkably, probate lending exists in a legal vacuum.
There is no authority on whether these agreements are usurious.19
Likewise, just one state, California, has a statute that addresses
probate lending.20 Thus, although $59 trillion will flow from the
dead to the living over the course of the next fifty years—the largest
posthumous wealth transfer in history21—borrowing against a de-
cedent’s estate is the most unstudied and unregulated species of
fringe finance.
ACTIONS: QUESTIONABLE BUSINESS PRACTICES IDENTIFIED 6-8 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/670/663800.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A3W-RRGN]; Jeff Schwartz, The Corporatization of
Personhood, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1152 n.226; Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Loans Borrowed
Against Pensions Squeeze Retirees, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
04/28/business/economy/pension-loans-drive-retirees-into-more-debt.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=1&&gwh=64F6F14410B9365AB93B3B06A6B2115D&gwt=pay [https://perma.cc/
4VPR-5LCF] [hereinafter Silver-Greenberg, Retirees]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg, New York
State Investigating Pension-Advance Firms, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (May 7, 2013, 2:14 PM),
http:// dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/07/new-york-state-investigating-pension-advance-firms/
[https://perma.cc/EKC3-EBHE] [hereinafter Silver-Greenberg, Pension-Advance].
16. See, e.g., James v. Nat’l Fin., LLC, 132 A.3d 799, 811 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“Put mildly,
widespread controversy exists over high-interest credit products that are predominantly
marketed to and used by lower-income, credit-impaired consumers.”).
17. See infra Part I.A. 
18. See David Lazarus, Probate No Time for Preying, S.F. GATE (Oct. 13, 2004, 4:00 AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Probate-no-time-for-preying-2717738.php [https://
perma.cc/3JPK-UHZ3] [hereinafter Lazarus, Probate]; David Lazarus, Sorry for Your Loss—
Would a Cash Advance Ease Your Pain?, S.F. GATE (Oct. 8, 2004, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.
com/business/article/Sorry-for-your-loss-would-a-cash-advance-ease-2719166.php [https://
perma.cc/G2X2-PJN4] [hereinafter Lazarus, Sorry for Your Loss]; Brigid McMenamin, For
Impatient Heirs, FORBES (Aug. 7, 2000, 12:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2000/0807/
6604110a.html [https://perma.cc/32FA-YQQ2].
19. Likewise, only a single, unpublished federal district court opinion has considered
whether probate loans fall under the TILA. See Reed v. Val-Chris Invs., Inc., No. 11CV371
BEN (WMC), 2011 WL 6028001, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2011); see also infra note 328.
20. See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text. 
21. See Robert Frank, $59 Trillion to Go to Heirs, Charity by 2061, CNBC (May 29, 2014,
5:00 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/05/28/greatest-wealth-transfer-in-history-underway-59-
trillion-to-heirs-charity-by-2061.html [https://perma.cc/P8SJ-67MN].
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In 2016, a coauthor and I published an article called Probate
Lending, which began to fill this gap.22 We used a dataset that I had
previously assembled of all 594 testate and intestate administra-
tions stemming from deaths that occurred in 2007 in Alameda
County, California.23 Because California requires probate lenders to
file their contracts in the judicial record, we were able to examine
information that would normally be private, such as the amounts
borrowed and repaid and the length of time between the advance
and the end of the probate case.24 We found seventy-seven loans, in
which firms paid $808,500 to acquire $1,378,786 in decedents’
assets.25 
This companion Article picks up where Probate Lending left off.
It augments the research I used to cowrite Probate Lending with a
study of every new matter that came on calendar in Alameda
County between March 1, 2009, and December 31, 2010. This addi-
tional sample increases the total size of my dataset to 2100 estates
and 291 loans. It leaves little doubt that probate lending is a lu-
crative business. Indeed, the ten different firms in my data entered
into deals with borrowers from a dozen states, obtaining nearly $5
million in property.
In addition, this Article situates probate lending within the larger
debate over fringe finance. Probate Lending compared probate lend-
ers to litigation lenders (companies that buy a stake in a pending
civil lawsuit).26 This Article goes further by considering how probate
loans stack up against a variety of fringe products, including tax
22. See generally David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Probate Lending, 126
YALE L.J. 102 (2016).
23. See id. at 130-31. I previously used this dataset to write two other articles. See
generally David Horton, In Partial Defense of Probate: Evidence from Alameda County,
California, 103 GEO. L.J. 605 (2015) [hereinafter Horton, In Partial Defense]; David Horton,
Wills Law on the Ground, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1094 (2015).
24. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 130-31.
25. See id. at 132-33. For two articles that criticize Probate Lending, see generally Jeremy
Kidd, Clarifying the “Probate Lending” Debate: A Response to Professors Horton and Chan-
drasekher (Mar. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Kidd, Response], https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2870615 [https://perma.cc/6KK4-3BTQ]; and
Jeremy Kidd, Probate Funding and the Litigation Funding Debate (July 28, 2017) (unpub-
lished manuscript) [hereinafter Kidd, Funding], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3010374 [https://perma.cc/BU8V-2HRM]. I address Professor Kidd’s work infra
notes 183, 185, 220, 321.
26. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 110-18.
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refund anticipation loans, payday loans, and pension loans. The
Article contends that many of the fairness concerns that have
prompted courts and policymakers to regulate these arrangements27
also plague probate lending. For instance, because probate lenders
charge markups of thousands of dollars, but only wait an average
of about fifteen months until the estate closes, the mean APR in my
dataset is a sky-high 50 percent.28 Moreover, consumers are ill-
equipped to assess the pros and cons of a probate loan. Unlike
lenders, who routinely participate in probate, most heirs and be-
neficiaries are unfamiliar with the process. For these reasons, gov-
ernmental intervention into the market for inheritance rights is
necessary.
The Article then considers how to regulate probate lending. It
starts by urging the California legislature to revise its probate
lending statute by making judicial review of probate loans manda-
tory, rather than permissive.29 In addition, it doubles down on one
of Probate Lending ’s most provocative claims: that probate lending
falls within the ambit of usury laws and the TILA.30 Admittedly,
these venerable consumer protection measures are subject to an
important limit: they only govern advances of money that are
certain to be repaid.31 On their face, probate loans do not seem to
meet this benchmark. Because they are structured as nonrecourse
assignments of inheritance rights, lenders recover nothing if the
estate becomes insolvent.32 Yet my data shows that this hazard is
illusory. Companies recovered the full amount of the principal and
interest on 97.5 percent of their probate loans.33 Finally, to fill gaps
in states that have abolished or weakened their usury laws, the Ar-
ticle proposes that courts review probate loans under the contract
defense of unconscionability.
The Article contains three Parts. Part I lays the groundwork by
surveying three well-known fringe products—tax refund anticipa-
tion loans, payday loans, and pension loans—and comparing them
27. See infra Part I.A.
28. See infra Part II.B.1.
29. See infra Part III.A.
30. See infra Part III.B.
31. See infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 293-302 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part II.B.3.
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to probate loans. Part II describes my research methodology and
presents my results. Part III uses this data to offer guidance to
courts and policymakers as they confront the budding practice of
borrowing against rights in a decedent’s estate.
I. BORROWING ON THE FRINGES
This Part describes how probate lending fits within the larger
universe of fringe finance. It first describes how fringe products
have sparked heated debate and attracted interest from Congress,
agencies, state legislatures, and judges. It then pivots to probate
loans. It demonstrates that we know little about probate lending,
and that the practice is subject to very few legal constraints.
A. The Rise of Fringe Finance
Until the end of the twentieth century, consumer credit was one
of the most regulated industries in America. For starters, usury
statutes kept predatory lenders at bay. Although these laws are
riddled with exceptions,34 they generally cap the amount of annual
interest on a loan for “personal, family, or household purposes” at
between 8 and 12 percent.35 Likewise, in 1968, Congress passed the
TILA.36 The TILA requires lenders to disclose information to
34. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916.1 (West 2017) (exempting some loans made by licensed
real estate agents); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 31:1-1(e)(1) (West 2017) (excluding loans for $50,000
or more, with the exception of those secured by a first lien on residential real estate); WASH.
REV. CODE § 63.14.010(7) (2017) (carving out “retail installment contract[s]”). 
35. See CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1(1) (10 percent); OKLA. CONST. art. XIV, § 2 (10 percent);
ALA. CODE § 8-8-1 (2017) (8 percent); ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010(a) (2017) (10.5 percent); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 5-2-201(1) (2017) (12 percent); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/4(1) (2017) (9 percent);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 438.31(1) (2017) (7 percent); MINN. STAT. § 334.01(1) (2017) (8 percent);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-17-1(2) (2017) (10 percent); MO. REV. STAT. § 408.030(1) (2017) (10
percent); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(A) (West 2017) (8 percent); 41 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 201(a), 202 (West 2017) (6 percent); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.020(1)(a) (2017)
(12 percent); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 31:1-1(a) (West 2017) (16 percent); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 5-501(1) (McKinney 2017) (6 percent); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.004(a) (West 2017) (10
percent).
36. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1608, 1610-1613, 1631-1635, 1637-1651, 1661-1667f (2012)).
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prospective clients in a regimented format37 and imposes strict lia-
bility for violating these mandates.38
However, near the dawn of the new millennium, the landscape
changed. First, the Supreme Court dealt usury statutes a body blow
with its decision in Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First
of Omaha Service Corp.39 The National Bank Act (NBA) allows na-
tional banks to charge “interest at the rate allowed by the laws of
the State ... where the bank is located.”40 The Justices interpreted
this provision to permit national banks to charge all of their cus-
tomers whatever interest rate was allowed in the jurisdiction where
they are headquartered.41 In turn, this prompted national banks to
set up shop within states that have no usury limits—such as Dela-
ware, South Dakota, and Utah—and “export” this laissez-faire re-
gime throughout the country.42
Second, credit became a hot commodity. Consumer debt soared
from about $650 billion in the late 1970s to $5.6 trillion in 1998.43
This massive increase was driven largely by the prime market,
which includes home mortgages and credit cards.44 But as Amer-
icans began to borrow in record numbers, entrepreneurs saw oppor-
tunities in the shadowy subprime sector.45 As the next Subsections
describe, these entrepreneurs designed a range of financial arrange-
ments that try to evade consumer protection laws.
37. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-1632 (2012).
38. See, e.g., Brodo v. Bankers Tr. Co., 847 F. Supp. 353, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that
the TILA imposes liability “even if the violation is technical and unintended” (citing Smith v.
Fid. Consumer Disc. Co., 898 F.2d 896, 898 (3d Cir. 1990))).
39. See 439 U.S. 299, 313-14 (1978). 
40. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2012).
41. See Marquette Nat’l Bank, 439 U.S. at 313; see also Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517
U.S. 735, 745-46 (1996) (interpreting the term “interest” in section 85 of the NBA to include
a broad range of fees).
42. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 99.050 (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-3-1.1 (2017); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 15-1-1(1) (LexisNexis 2017); see also Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic,
Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88
MINN. L. REV. 518, 552 (2004) (discussing Marquette’s aftermath). State-chartered banks can
also import rates under section 27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831d(a) (2012).
43. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 13, at 591-92.
44. See id. at 594. 
45. See id.
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1. Tax Refund Anticipation Loans
In the 1980s, tax preparers and banks teamed up to provide what
they called “instant tax refunds,” and later become known as refund
anticipation loans (RALs).46 This service involves three steps. First,
a tax preparer calculates a consumer’s expected refund.47 Second,
the tax preparer performs due diligence by checking the IRS’s “debt
indicator,” which reveals whether the consumer’s check will be off-
set by child support or student loan obligations.48 Third, if the
consumer is, in fact, entitled to money back from the government,
a financial institution offers to pay this sum immediately in return
for a small service charge.49
RALs were once wildly popular. H&R Block, Jackson Hewitt,
Liberty Tax Service, Instant Tax Service, Bank One, JPMorgan
Chase, HSBC, Republic Bank & Trust Company, and Santa Barbara
Bank & Trust offered the product.50 These companies issued be-
tween eight and thirteen million RALs each year, generating hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in profits.51 In 2002, consumers paid
more than $1 billion in RAL fees.52
46. See GARY RIVLIN, BROKE, USA: FROM PAWNSHOPS TO POVERTY, INC.—HOW THE WORK-
ING POOR BECAME BIG BUSINESS 27, 171-77 (2010). The IRS prohibits tax preparers from
issuing RALs themselves; hence, these companies partnered with financial institutions. Barr,
supra note 13, at 172-73; see Rev. Proc. 98-50, 1998-2 C.B. 375.
47. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, CHARACTERISTICS OF USERS OF REFUND ANTICIPA-
TION LOANS AND REFUND ANTICIPATION CHECKS 3 (2010), https://www.treasury.gov/ resource-
center/financial-education/Documents/Characteristics%20of%20Users%20of%20Refund%20
Anticipation%20Loans%20and%20Refund%20Anticipation%20Checks.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3258-GPLL].
48. Cf. id. at 3 n.1, 5. The IRS stopped providing the debt indicator in 1995, but began
again in 1999. See Barr, supra note 13, at 173.
49. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 47, at 3.
50. See id. at 5-6.
51. See CHI CHI WU & JEAN ANN FOX, MAJOR CHANGES IN THE QUICK TAX REFUND LOAN
INDUSTRY 6 (2010), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/report-ral-2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E75P-8AER]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 47, at 5, 6
fig.1. Companies also offered refund anticipation checks (RACs), in which a bank deposits the
refund into a dummy bank account and then issues a check or prepaid debit card to the
customer. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 47, at 3. RACs are marketed to
taxpayers who do not have bank accounts. See Blake Ellis, New Tax Refund Loans Carry Sky-
High Fees and Rates, CNN (Mar. 6, 2013, 10:30 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/06/pf/
taxes/tax-refund-loans/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 987D-MFXX].
52. See Stacy Cowley, Tax Refund Loans Are Revamped and Resurrected, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/business/tax-refund-loans-are-revamped-and-
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However, RALs drew fire from academics and consumer watch-
dogs. These critics raised three main points. First, they accused tax
preparers and banks of targeting low-income communities.53 Indeed,
more than half of RAL customers received the Earned Income Tax
Credit (a subsidy provided to the working poor).54 Second, they
argued that taxpayers did not understand RAL terms. For example,
RALs usually required consumers to cover any shortfall between
their anticipated and actual refunds.55 Yet surveys discovered that
70 percent of consumers did not realize that they would be on the
hook if their check from the IRS was less than expected.56 Third,
RALs featured astronomical interest rates. In raw dollar amounts,
RAL fees seemed modest: they usually ranged from $30 to $100.57
But because many taxpayers received their refunds by electronic
deposit no later than two weeks after they filed their return, the
APR on a RAL often reached the triple digits.58 For example, a
$1500 RAL with slightly more than a $60 fee that is repaid within
ten days would be the equivalent of a loan with an APR of 149
percent.59
Tax preparation chains and banks mounted a full-throated de-
fense. They claimed that RALs were valuable for customers who
could not bank electronically and thus would need to wait longer for
resurrected.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2F5P-RWLW].
53. See Barr, supra note 13, at 169, 171-72; Cords, supra note 13, at 377-81; Diane Hell-
wig, Note, Exposing the Loansharks in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Re-regulating the Consumer
Credit Market Makes Economic Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1598-1600 (2005); Ann
Carrns, After This Year, No More Tax Refund Loans, N.Y. TIMES: BUCKS (Jan. 19, 2012, 1:53
PM), https://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/after-this-year-no-more-tax-refund-loans/
[https://perma.cc/5CQL-VFYL].
54. See Bernice Yeung, Tax Refund Scheme Targets the Working Poor, NATION (Apr. 17,
2006), https://www.thenation.com/article/tax-refund-scheme-targets-working-poor/ [https://
perma.cc/NBJ8-ETSV].
55. See Book, supra note 13, at 99.
56. See CHI CHI WU & JEAN ANN FOX, PICKING TAXPAYERS’ POCKETS, DRAINING TAX RELIEF
DOLLARS: REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS STILL SLICING INTO LOW-INCOME AMERICANS’ HARD-
EARNED TAX REFUNDS 8 (2005), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/ral/
2005-ral-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9VZ-L5MY].
57. See Barr, supra note 13, at 169-70; Ellis, supra note 51.
58. See Press Release, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., One Last Bite: Final Year for Bank Tax
Refund Anticipation Loans (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/ral-pr-
2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC7L-BJF5]. 
59. See Carrns, supra note 53. 
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a paper check from the IRS.60 Likewise, they touted their product as
“a critical way to pay off holiday debt, catch up on overdue bills[,] or
cover emergency expenses like car repairs.”61
Nevertheless, private plaintiffs, public interest organizations,
and state attorneys general filed class actions under usury laws
and the TILA against RAL providers.62 Tax preparers and banks re-
sponded by noting that usury laws and the TILA only govern
“loans.”63 In turn, they contended that RALs were not “loans,” but
rather “assignment[s] of [the] right to receive an income tax re-
fund.”64 However, most courts rejected this argument, reasoning
that RALs bear the hallmarks of a “loan,” fronting “money to tax-
payers in exchange for the right to collect a payment.”65 On the
other hand, tax preparers that had joined forces with national banks
had more success using Marquette as a shield against usury laws.
For example, in Christiansen v. Beneficial National Bank, a federal
district court held that the NBA shielded a RAL with an APR of
more than 245 percent from Georgia’s usury statute.66
Likewise, efforts by state lawmakers to regulate RALs achieved
mixed results. Thirteen jurisdictions passed legislation that require
tax preparers and banks to inform consumers of the loan’s salient
features, including its estimated APR.67 In addition, a few statutes
went further. Connecticut and New Jersey tried to cap RAL interest
60. See Yeung, supra note 54. 
61. Cowley, supra note 52.
62. See, e.g., Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 194, 195 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Complaint
for Injunction, Civil Penalties & Other Relief at 12-13, People v. JTH Tax, Inc., No. CGC-07-
460778, 2007 WL 6832818 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007); Yeung, supra note 54. 
63. See Cullen v. Bragg, 350 S.E.2d 798, 799-801 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); see also State ex rel.
Salazar v. Cash Now Store, Inc., 31 P.3d 161, 164 (Colo. 2001) (noting that the district court
found that the RALs were merely “purchases of choses in action”).
64. See Cullen, 350 S.E.2d at 799. 
65. Salazar, 31 P.3d at 166-67; see also Drysdale & Keest, supra note 13, at 644 (reporting
that state attorney general opinions and trial courts held that RALs “were in fact loans sub-
ject to the usury law”). But see Cullen, 350 S.E.2d at 799 (reaching the opposite conclusion).
66. 972 F. Supp. 681, 684 (S.D. Ga. 1997).
67. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22251(g) (West 2017); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT., 177/10
(2017); MINN. STAT. § 270C.445 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 604B.210 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:11D-3 (West 2017); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 372(e)(2)(i) (McKinney 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 53-249(d) (2017); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 673.605, 673.712 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-29-202(d)
(2017); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 352.004 (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-2500 (2017); WASH.
REV. CODE § 19.265.030 (2017); WIS. STAT. §§ 421.301, 422.310 (2017).
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rates,68 but courts held that the NBA preempted these rules when
applied to national banks.69 Conversely, North Carolina had more
success with its Refund Anticipation Loan Act.70 This rubric re-
quired lenders to file a fee schedule with an administrative agency,
which decides whether it is fair.71 Because the law exempted nation-
al banks, the state supreme court upheld it against a preemption
challenge.72
Finally, in 2010, the Obama Administration took decisive action.73
The IRS announced that it would no longer provide RAL issuers
with the “debt indicator.”74 Without this key component of the RAL-
creation process, the three biggest banks in the industry—HSBC,
JPMorgan Chase, and Santa Barbara Bank & Trust—folded up
their tents.75 Then, in February 2011, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Commission notified the remaining institutions willing to under-
write RALs that lending against tax refunds without the benefit of
the debt indicator was unsafe.76 Thus, RAL sales declined to about
one million per year.77 
2. Payday Loans
Payday lending began about three decades ago as spinoff from
check-cashing services.78 On weekends, when banks were closed,
some stores would cash personal checks for a small fee.79 Eventu-
ally, they agreed to accept checks and not deposit them for several
68. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-480(d) (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:11D-1, 17:11D-3. 
69. See Pac. Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, 542 F.3d 341, 353-54 (2d Cir. 2008); Pac.
Capital Bank, N.A. v. Milgram, No. 08-0223 (FLW), 2008 WL 700180, at *1, *8 (D.N.J. Mar.
13, 2008).
70. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-249.
71. See id. § 53-249(a)-(b). 
72. See N.C. Ass’n of Elec. Tax Filers, Inc. v. Graham, 429 S.E.2d 544, 549, 551 (N.C.
1993). 
73. In 2006, Congress had taken a small step in this direction by prohibiting tax preparers
and banks from charging military personnel an APR of higher than 36 percent on a RAL. See
32 C.F.R. § 232.4(b) (2017). 
74. See Press Release, IRS, IRS Removes Debt Indicator for 2011 Tax Filing Season (Aug.
5, 2010), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-10-089.pdf [https://perma.cc/46T5-4XKW].
75. See Press Release, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 58.
76. See id.
77. See Cowley, supra note 52.
78. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 14, at 862.
79. See id.
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days, charging slightly more for the extra risk.80 This practice e-
volved into payday lending.81
The payday lending market has grown exponentially. In 1990,
there were about two hundred payday lenders in the United
States.82 Today, there are more than twenty thousand, which ex-
ceeds the combined number of McDonald’s restaurants, J.C. Penney
outlets, and Target stores nationwide.83 These companies serve
nearly twenty million households and reap about $40 billion each
year.84 
In a typical payday loan, a borrower fills out an application and
provides a driver’s license, pay stub, and bank statement.85 She then
writes a check for between $50 and $500, postdating it to coincide
with her next payday.86 In return, the lender gives the consumer a
smaller amount of cash, usually withholding about $15 for every
$100 advanced.87 For instance, on February 1, a customer might cut
a check for $230, date it February 15, and receive $200 immediately.
When the due date arrives, the lender cashes the check unless the
borrower has already repaid the principal and the markup.88
Payday lending is polarizing for several reasons. For one, as with
RALs, the short timeframe between the consumer’s receipt of the
cash and the due date transforms small fees into high APRs.89
Indeed, studies show that the APRs on payday loans can be as high
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See JOHN P. CASKEY, THE ECONOMICS OF PAYDAY LENDING 11 (2002). 
83. See Paige Marta Skiba & Jean Xiao, Consumer Litigation Funding: Just Another Form
of Payday Lending?, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2017, at 117, 120.
84. Astra Taylor, Why It’s So Hard to Regulate Payday Lenders, NEW YORKER (Aug. 3,
2016), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-its-so-hard-to-regulate-payday-
lenders [https://perma.cc/4EBF-52ZZ].
85. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 9-10.
86. See Smith v. Check-N-Go, Inc. of Ill., 200 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 1999); Johnson, supra
note 14, at 9-10.
87. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 14, at 861-62.
88. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 10.
89. To use the example above, a lender who receives $230 two weeks after making a $200
advance earns an APR of nearly 400 percent.
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as 800 percent.90 In addition, payday loans often “roll over.”91 A
rollover occurs when a borrower pays a service charge to postpone
the repayment date or takes out a new loan to repay an existing
loan.92 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) found
that 80 percent of payday loans are renewed within fourteen days.93
In 2015, more borrowers in California entered into ten payday loans
than those who took out only one.94 According to the Center for
Responsible Lending, rollovers are so common that “[t]he typical
payday borrower pays back $793 for a $325 loan.”95 These statistics
are commonly cited as proof that consumers are wildly over-opti-
mistic about their ability to discharge their debt.96
But payday lenders have defended their vocation. For one, they
argue that their high APRs are necessary because defaults are en-
demic.97 Indeed, write-offs account for one-fifth of their operating
costs.98 As one payday lending advocate puts it, because the true
90. See EDMUND MIERZWINSKI ET AL., U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GRP. & CONSUMER
FED’N OF AM., SHOW ME THE MONEY! A SURVEY OF PAYDAY LENDERS AND REVIEW OF PAYDAY
LENDER LOBBYING IN STATE LEGISLATURE 1, 7 (2000), https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/12/Show-Me-the-Money_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6V7-NR6S].
91. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 56-58.
92. Id. at 56-57.
93. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB DATA POINT: PAYDAY
LENDING 4 (2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_cfpb_report_payday-lending.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AXH9-CSFL].
94. See Payday Lending Is Declining, ECONOMIST (Apr. 8, 2017), http://www.economist.
com/news/finance-and-economics/21720297-regulators-squeeze-industry-payday-lending-
declining [https://perma.cc/9G8D-ZXWN].
95. URIAH KING ET AL., FINANCIAL QUICKSAND: PAYDAY LENDING SINKS BORROWERS IN
DEBT WITH $4.2 BILLION IN PREDATORY FEES EVERY YEAR 6 (2006), http://www.responsible
lending.org/sites/default/files/research-publication/rr012-Financial_Quicksand-1106.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UA72-RZFC].
96. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 14, at 56 (“The payday loan product is
arguably designed to take advantage of consumers’ optimism bias and their consistent
underestimation of the risk of nonpayment.”); Karen E. Francis, Note, Rollover, Rollover: A
Behavioral Law and Economics Analysis of the Payday-Loan Industry, 88 TEX. L. REV. 611,
629-30 (2010). But see Robert DeYoung et al., Should Payday Lenders Be Banned?, NEWSWEEK
(Oct. 25, 2015, 4:02 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/should-payday-lenders-be-banned-386766
[https://perma.cc/YP22-KBWA] (challenging the idea that payday lending customers are
unduly optimistic). 
97. See Tim Worstall, Why Payday Loans Are So Expensive, FORBES (Dec. 20, 2011, 1:44
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2011/12/20/why-payday-loans-are-so-expensive/
#68109c472039 [https://perma.cc/WA5S-KX9D].
98. See Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the
Price? 10 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005), https://www.fdic.
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profit on every failed loan is zero, “the stratospheric APRs are only
expected rates, not actual rates.”99 Lenders also contend that their
product opens doors for low-income individuals or those with tarn-
ished credit histories.100 They claim that eliminating their services
will drive vulnerable populations toward even worse arrangements,
such as car title and installment loans, which allow the lender to
repossess the debtor’s property upon default.101
These arguments have not persuaded regulators, which have
subjected payday lenders to a phalanx of rules. At the federal level,
companies must comply with the TILA.102 Although lenders initially
argued that the statute did not apply to them because they were
merely cashing checks—not making “loans”—the vast majority of
courts disagreed.103
Likewise, many states have adopted payday lending legislation.
Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West Virginia either expressly ban
these transactions or do so through the back door by requiring them
gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2005/wp2005/2005-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/XGX2-BTT7].
99. Robert DeYoung, What’s Missing from Payday Lending Debate: Facts, AM. BANKER
(Nov. 25, 2015, 9:30 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/whats-missing-from-
payday-lending-debate-facts [https://perma.cc/B4JK-WSY4].
100. See Stephen L. Carter, Restrictions on Payday Loans Hurt the Poor, BLOOMBERG
QUINT (June 10, 2016, 9:16 AM), https://www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/2016/06/09/
restrictions-on-payday-loans-hurt-the-poor [https://perma.cc/2U7K-6YSY] (“It’s important to
remember that reducing the supply of credit to high-risk borrowers doesn’t necessarily reduce
the demand for credit by high-risk borrowers.”); see also Paige Marta Skiba, Regulation of
Payday Loans: Misguided?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1023, 1041-42 (2012) (surveying the
empirical literature and concluding that “while there certainly exists evidence that payday
loans are harmful to some consumers in some situations, there is as much evidence that
payday loans help consumers”).
101. See Carter, supra note 100; cf. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 14, at 886-94 (“[T]he
evidence suggests that bans may well cause consumers to borrow from sources that provide
products that are less beneficial.”). But see Michael Kenneth, Payday Lending: Can “Repu-
table” Banks End Cycles of Debt?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 659, 665 (2008) (“[S]tatistics on frequency
of use of payday loans demonstrate that payday loans are not used just for emergencies, but
become a regular part of most borrowers’ lives.”).
102. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1608, 1610-1613, 1631-1635, 1637-1651, 1661-1667f
(2012).
103. See, e.g., Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing of Cookeville, TN, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1042,
1048 (M.D. Tenn. 1999); Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 957-58 (E.D. Ky. 1997). In 2000,
the Federal Reserve amended Regulation Z (the primary interpretive guide to the TILA) to
clarify that payday loans fall within the ambit of the statute. See 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2017).
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to comply with their usury laws.104 Other jurisdictions impose strin-
gent licensing requirements on lenders,105 limit rollovers,106 or cap
the amount,107 the term,108 or the APR109 of payday loans.
104. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. LXXXIX, § 3; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-613 (2017);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-556 (2017); D.C. CODE § 26-319 (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-1
(2017); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-314 (LexisNexis 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 96
(2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:15A-47 (West 2017); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 373 (McKinney 2017);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-173 (2017); 63 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2325 (West 2017); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 2519 (2017); W. VA. CODE § 32A-3-1 (2016).
105. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 23005 (West 2017); IDAHO CODE § 28-46-402 (2017); 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 122/3-3 (2017); IOWA CODE § 533D.3 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286.9-040
(West 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 487.2131(1) (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-904 (2010); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 13-08-02 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.36 (LexisNexis 2017); OR. REV.
STAT. § 725A.020 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-4-52 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-104
(2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-23-201 (LexisNexis 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1801 (2017);
WASH. REV. CODE § 31.45.030 (2017).
106. Statutes that outlaw rollovers include CAL. FIN. CODE § 23036(b), FLA. STAT.
§ 560.404(18) (2017), 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 122/2-30, IOWA CODE § 533D.10(1)(e), MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 487.2153, MINN. STAT. § 47.60 subdiv. 2(f) (2017), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.41(E),
(G), TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-112(q), VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1816(6), and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-
14-364 (2017). Other laws only allow a specified number of rollovers. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 5-3.1-108(1) (2017) (permitting one rollover); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2235A(a)(2)
(2017) (four); N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-08-12(12) (one); OR. REV. STAT. § 725A.064(6) (two); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 54-4-65 (four); WASH. REV. CODE § 31.45.073(2) (one); WIS. STAT.
§ 138.14(12)(a) (2017) (one).
107. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 06.50.410 (2017) ($500); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-106(1)
($500); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2227(7) ($1000); FLA. STAT. § 560.404(5) ($500); IDAHO CODE
§ 28-46-412(2) ($1000); IOWA CODE § 533D.10(1)(b) ($500); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-404(1)(c)
(2017) ($500); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 487.2153(1) ($600); MINN. STAT. § 47.60 subdiv. 1(a)
($350); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-67-519(2) (2017) ($500); MO. REV. STAT. § 408.500(1) (2017)
($500); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 399-A:17(VI) (2017) ($500); N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-08-12(3)
($500); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.41(E) ($500); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 3106(7) (2017) ($500);
19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-14.4-5.1(a) (2017) ($500); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-112(o) ($500); VA.
CODE ANN. § 6.2-1816(5) ($500); WASH. REV. CODE § 31.45.073(2) (“seven hundred dollars or
thirty percent of the gross monthly income of the borrower, whichever is lower”); WIS. STAT.
§ 138.14(12)(b) (the lesser of “$1,500 or 35 percent of the customer’s gross monthly income”).
108. Many restrict loan duration to about a month. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 533D.10(1)(c)
(thirty-one days); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 487.2153(4)(b) (thirty-one days); MINN. STAT. § 47.60
subdiv. 2(b) (thirty days); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.39(B) (thirty-one days); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 725A.064(3) (thirty-one days); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-112(d) (thirty-one days); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 40-14-363(b) (one month); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2227(7) (sixty days); WASH. REV.
CODE § 31.45.073(2) (forty-five days); WIS. STAT. § 138.14(1)(k) (ninety days).
109. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 23036(a) (limiting the APR to “15 percent of the face
amount of the check”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-105 (45 percent); FLA. STAT. § 560.404(6) (10
percent of the check plus no more than a $5 verification fee); IOWA CODE § 533D.9(1) (15
percent of the first $100 and $10 on each further $100 increment); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 286.9-100(1) ($15 per each $100); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-722(2) (2017) (36 percent); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.40(A) (28 percent); OR. REV. STAT. § 725A.064(1) (36 percent); TENN.
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Payday lenders have tried mightily to navigate around these com-
mands. Some sought to insulate themselves from state law claims
by partnering with national banks and invoking Marquette.110 In
response, plaintiffs began to file lawsuits that omitted the bank and
named only the payday lender as a defendant.111 To this day, it
remains unclear whether the NBA preempts such a surgically
tailored complaint.112 In addition, lenders forged alliances with
Native American tribes in order to invoke sovereign immunity—a
gambit that has also divided courts.113
CODE ANN. § 45-17-112(b) (15 percent); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1817(A) (36 percent).
110. See, e.g., Hudson v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., No. IP 01-1336-C H/S, 2002 WL 1205060,
at *4 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2002); Goleta Nat’l Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d 711, 713
(E.D.N.C. 2002); Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1282,
1284 (D. Colo. 2002).
111. See, e.g., Cmty. State Bank v. Knox, 850 F. Supp. 2d 586, 590 (M.D.N.C. 2012), aff ’d,
523 F. App’x 925 (4th Cir. 2013); Flowers v. EZPawn Okla., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1204
(N.D. Okla. 2004).
112. Most of the case law on the subject deals with the threshold issue of federal
jurisdiction. Under the complete preemption doctrine, complaints under state law can
nevertheless give rise to federal question jurisdiction if “the pre-emptive force of a [federal]
statute is ... ‘extraordinary.’” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (quoting
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)). Payday lenders have asserted that the
NBA is such a statute and thus allows them to remove class actions that seek relief under
state consumer protection principles to federal court. See, e.g., Ace Cash Express, 188 F. Supp.
2d at 1284. Courts have been skeptical of this argument when the plaintiff ’s allegations are
directed only at the lender and make no mention of the bank. See Knox, 850 F. Supp. 2d at
600-01; Flowers, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1204-06; cf. Hudson, 2002 WL 1205060, at *6-8 (dis-
missing complaint where plaintiff alleged that a national bank made the payday loan); Ace
Cash Express, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1285. 
113. See Nathalie Martin & Joshua Schwartz, The Alliance Between Payday Lenders and
Tribes: Are Both Tribal Sovereignty and Consumer Protection at Risk?, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 751, 778 (2012) (noting that “it is unclear whether and under what circumstances the
typical tribally-affiliated payday lender will meet the[ ] test[ ]” for sovereign immunity).
Compare People ex rel. Owen v. Miami Nation Enters., 386 P.3d 357, 379 (Cal. 2016) (refusing
to grant sovereign immunity), with Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. State, 242 P.3d
1099, 1108 (Colo. 2010) (remanding the sovereign immunity issue to the trial court). Payday
lenders have also attempted to minimize liability by lacing their contracts with mandatory
arbitration clauses and class action waivers. See, e.g., McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC
v. Betts, 112 So. 3d 1176, 1188 (Fla. 2013) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act precludes
a court from deeming a class arbitration waiver in a payday loan to be unconscionable). In
addition, some lenders took the extraordinary step of mandating arbitration under the rules
of particular Indian tribes that “do[ ] not authorize [a]rbitation.” Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC,
764 F.3d 765, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); cf. Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 856 F.3d 330, 336 (4th
Cir. 2017) (featuring a lender that “purposefully drafted the choice of law provisions in the
arbitration agreement to avoid the application of state and federal consumer protection
laws”).
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In 2017, the CFPB entered the fray.114 It finalized a series of new
rules that govern loans with terms of forty-five days or fewer.115 In
particular, the CFPB requires lenders to take steps to determine
whether borrowers will be able to repay their loans, and limits each
loan to two rollovers.116 However, as this Article entered the pub-
lication stage, House Republicans introduced a bill to repeal the
CFPB’s regulations under the Congressional Review Act.117 
3. Pension Loans
As the economy soured in the mid-2000s, firms began to buy the
right to receive monthly retirement benefits from former public-
sector employees.118 These businesses typically provide lump sums
in return for five to ten years of a consumer’s future pension pay-
ments.119
114. See David Silberman, We’ve Proposed a Rule to Protect Consumers from Payday Debt
Traps, CFPB (June 2, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/weve-proposed-
rule-protect-consumers-payday-debt-traps/ [https://perma.cc/LN9M-HAJ3].
115. See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg.
47,864, 47,864, 48,168 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041); CFPB
Finalizes Rule to Stop Payday Debt Traps, CFPB (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.
gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-finalizes-rule-stop-payday-debt-traps/ [https://perma.cc/T3V7-
UKRN].
116. See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at
47,864-65, 48,169, 48,196.
117. See Jim Puzzanghera, House Lawmakers Move to Repeal New CFPB Payday Lending
Rules, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2017, 10:35 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-cfpb-
payday-loan-repeal-20171201-story.html [https://perma.cc/T6G2-8G57]; see also ECONOMIST,
supra note 94 (speculating that the Trump administration would try to thwart the rule).
Another wild card is that the constitutionality of the CFPB is in doubt. In PHH Corp. v.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the D.C. Circuit held that the agency’s structure
violated Article II of the Constitution. 839 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 881 F.3d
75 (D.C. Cir. 2018). However, just before this Article went to print, the D.C. Circuit sitting en
banc reversed the original appellate panel’s order. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc); see Lorraine Woellert, Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau Wins Rehearing on Court Ruling, in Setback to GOP, POLITICO (Feb. 16, 2017, 3:53
PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-court-
ruling-235109 [https://perma.cc/V595-EU8C].
118. See Silver-Greenberg, Retirees, supra note 15. 
119. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 3. Pension lenders often
insist that the borrower take out life insurance and list the company as a beneficiary. See
Silver-Greenberg, Retirees, supra note 15. Some of these companies then bundle the income
streams and sell them to investors. See Daniel Fisher & John Wasik, Investors Who ‘Buy’
Pensions Are Buying Trouble, FORBES (June 6, 2012, 11:34 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
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Although lenders often purchase pensions from veterans,120 the
practice probably violates the letter (and definitely violates the
spirit) of federal law.121 A federal anti-assignment statute dictates
that “[a]n enlisted member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine
Corps may not assign his pay, and if he does so, the assignment is
void.”122 The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the term “pay” in
the legislation to include “military retirement benefits.”123 Thus, the
Fourth Circuit and several federal judges have invoked the anti-
assignment law to invalidate pension loans made by former armed
service members.124 To try to avoid this restriction, pension lenders
have started to require veterans to open new bank accounts so that
the money does not flow directly from the government to the com-
pany.125 Courts have split over whether this additional step san-
itizes the transaction.126
Even though pension loans are not as heavily regulated as RALs
and payday loans, the government has cracked down hard on the
industry in the last five years. For example, the Los Angeles City
Attorney and the Attorneys General of Iowa and Massachusetts
banned a large pension lender called Future Income Payments, LLC
sites/danielfisher/2012/06/06/investors-who-buy-pensions-are-buying-trouble/ [https://perma.
cc/X5JZ-8W5C].
120. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Future Income Payments, LLC, 252 F. Supp. 3d
961, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2017).
121. STEVE TRIPOLI & AMY MIX, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., IN HARM’S WAY—AT HOME:
CONSUMER SCAMS AND THE DIRECT TARGETING OF AMERICA’S MILITARY AND VETERANS 25-26
(2003), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/special_projects/military/report-scams-facing-military.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7PGJ-5YHV].
122. 37 U.S.C. § 701(c) (2012). 
123. Barker v. Kansas, 503 U.S. 594, 605 (1992). 
124. See Dorfman v. Moorhous (In re Moorhous), 108 F.3d 51, 56 (4th Cir. 1997); Structured
Invs. Co. v. Webb (In re Webb), 376 B.R. 765, 767 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2007) (“Based upon the
plain language of § 701(c), the Court holds that the contract is unenforceable.”); Bowden v.
Structured Invs. Co. (In re Bowden), 315 B.R. 903, 908-10 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).
125. See Silver-Greenberg, Retirees, supra note 15. 
126. Compare In re Pierson, 447 B.R. 840, 848 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2011) (holding that a
veteran’s choice to assign proceeds of his pension after it had been deposited into his account
“does not frustrate the purpose of [the statute]”), and Structured Invs. Co. v. Weber (In re
Weber), Nos. BK07-82354-TJM, A08-8012-TJM, 2009 WL 983311, at *3 (Bankr. D. Neb. Apr.
10, 2009) (same), with Structured Invs. Co. v. Price (In re Price), 313 B.R. 805, 811 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 2004) (invalidating the transaction by considering its substance, rather than its
form), and Structured Invs. Co. v. Dunlap (In re Dunlap), 458 B.R. 301, 327 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2011) (same).
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from doing business within their respective jurisdictions.127 In 2013,
the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) subpoe-
naed ten pension lenders as part of its investigation into whether
they “dupe retirees into signing up for loans by disguising the[ir]
soaring interest rates.”128 Shortly afterward, the NYDFS and the
CFPB sued Pension Funding, LLC and Pension Income, LLC for
violating New York’s usury statute.129 Likewise, the Washington
Department of Financial Institutions filed complaints against two
large companies, seeking a cease-and-desist order and $250,000 in
fines.130
In 2014, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued
a comprehensive report on pension lenders.131 The GAO identified
thirty-eight firms that offer pension loans.132 The GAO noted two
unusual facts about these companies. First, a healthy plurality of
them were located in California.133 Second, many of these suppos-
edly independent businesses actually had murky connections to
each other. Thirty were either a subsidiary of another firm or simply
a different entity operating under another name.134 Undercover
127. See Press Release, L.A. City Attorney, City Attorney Mike Feuer Sues to End
Allegedly Predatory Pension Loan Business (Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.lacityattorney.org/
single-post/2017/02/16/City-Attorney-Mike-Feuer-Sues-to-End-Allegedly-Predatory-Pension-
Loan-Business [https://perma.cc/F5B9-VDLR]; Press Release, Iowa Dep’t of Justice Office of
the Attorney Gen., California-Based Pension Advance Company Banned in Iowa from Illegal
High-Interest Lending (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.iowaattorneygeneral.gov/newsroom/
attorney-general-california-based-pension-advance-company-banned-in-iowa-from-illegal-
high-interest/ [https://perma.cc/Q348-MS26]; Press Release, Mass. Attorney Gen., Lender to
Provide More Than $2 Million in Relief to Massachusetts Veterans, Other Consumers for
Pension Advance Scheme (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-
releases/2016/2016-03-28-veterans-pensions.html [https://perma.cc/X7UF-3FA8].
128. See Silver-Greenberg, Pension-Advance, supra note 15. 
129. See Complaint for Violations of the Consumer Fin. Prot. Act & N.Y. Banking & Fin.
Servs. Laws at para. 96, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Pension Funding, LLC, No. 8:15-cv-
1329, 2016 WL 7637656 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2016); see also John Wasik, A Classic Retirement
Trap: Why the CFPB Is Cracking Down on Pension Advance Loans, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2015,
4:39 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2015/08/20/a-classic-retirement-trap-why-
the-cfpb-is-cracking-down-on-pension-advance-loans/ [https://perma.cc/4ZQV-LSZM].
130. See Press Release, Wash. State Dep’t of Fin. Insts., DFI Fines Unlicensed Lenders
Providing Pension Loans (May 20, 2014), http://www.dfi.wa.gov/news/press/dfi-fines-
unlicensed-lenders-providing-pension-loans [https://perma.cc/8W4X-9VE5].
131. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15. 
132. See id. at 13.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 15.
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GAO investigators then solicited bids from the lenders.135 They
discovered that most sales representatives were careful not to de-
scribe their products as “loans.”136 They also found that companies
often did not disclose key facts to potential customers, including
their fees.137 Finally, they determined that the APRs on pensions
loans usually ranged from 27 percent to 46 percent.138 The GAO
concluded by inviting federal regulators to dig deeper and “deter-
mine whether practices such as the ones described in this report are
unfair or deceptive, and therefore may warrant related enforcement
action[ ].”139
In 2017, the rash of negative publicity about pension lending
sparked an unusual lawsuit. A pension lender that identified itself
only as “John Doe Company” sought to block the CFPB from dis-
closing the fact that the company was under investigation.140 John
Doe argued that the CFPB’s jurisdiction merely covers “consumer
financial product[s] [and] service[s],” and pensions advances do not
fit within that paradigm.141 A federal district court emphatically
disagreed, reasoning that “at least six state regulators and the City
of Los Angeles have found that [these] products do constitute
loans.”142 Thus, the CFPB appears to be on the cusp of following
135. See id. at 4.
136. See id. at 31; see also Stuart Rossman & Hellen Papavizas, When the Military Pay-
check Is Prey, TRIAL, Sept. 2006, at 43, 46 (noting that pension lenders “try to avoid providing
required disclosures by referring to the buyouts as something other than loans”); David
Lazarus, ‘Pension Advance’ Company Is Unmasked—And It’s No Friend of California
Consumers, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-
fi-lazarus-cfpb-future-income-payments-20170317-story.html [https://perma.cc/ABR7-JYFD]
(noting that pension lenders “insisted that they weren’t making loans” (quoting Tom Dresslar
from the California Department of Business Oversight)).
137. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 30.
138. See id. at 24. 
139. Id. at 40. 
140. See John Doe Co. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 235 F. Supp. 3d 194, 200-01 (D.D.C.
2017). The agency had served the company with a Civil Investigative Demand (CID). See id.
at 197. The agency has the power to issue CIDs—a kind of subpoena—if it “has reason to
believe that any person may be in possession, custody, or control of any ... information[ ] rele-
vant to a violation.” 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(1) (2012). John Doe was later revealed to be Future
Income Payments, LLC. See Lazarus, supra note 136.
141. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Future Income Payments, LLC, 252 F. Supp. 3d 961,
967 (C.D. Cal. 2017).
142. Id.
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through on the GAO’s recommendation and policing the market for
pension loans.
B. Probate Loans
This Section describes probate lending. It shows that the practice
differs in two crucial ways from tax refund, payday, and pension
lending: we know little about it, and it is barely regulated.
Probate lending appears to have been the brainchild of Douglas
B. Lloyd.143 In 1992, Lloyd founded Inheritance Funding Company
(IFC).144 His business model was simple. Probate—the traditional,
court-based process for managing the assets of decedents who make
wills or die intestate—is notoriously slow.145 IFC thus cast itself as
an elegant shortcut for prospective heirs and beneficiaries. It offers
to pay them cash up front in return for a share of their expected
inheritance.146 For instance, an heir or beneficiary might accept a
$15,000 lump sum in return for executing an assignment that en-
titled IFC to $25,000 from the estate whenever the probate case
concluded.147
This venture was inspired by several sources. The first was the
long-standing practice of “heir hunting.”148 In the early twentieth
century, firms began to search probate records—which are open to
the public—for wealthy intestate decedents who appeared to have
no close relatives.149 They would then locate the decedent’s next of
kin and sell them information about the probate matter in return
for a percentage of the estate.150 Likewise, IFC took advantage of
143. See, e.g., McMenamin, supra note 18. 
144. See, e.g., BBB Accredited Business Profile: Inheritance Funding Company, Inc., BETTER
BUS. BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org/greater-san-francisco/business-reviews/financial-services/
inheritance-funding-company-inc-in-san-francisco-ca-28284 [https://perma.cc/4XUW-MMQN].
145. See, e.g., John H. Martin, Reconfiguring Estate Settlement, 94 MINN. L. REV. 42, 49
(2009).
146. See McMenamin, supra note 18. 
147. See id. 
148. See Frank C. Ingraham, Note, Heir-Hunting: A Profession or a Racket?, 7 VAND. L.
REV. 104, 104 (1953). 
149. See id. 
150. See id. Courts initially denounced heir hunters as self-serving middlemen and nullified
their contracts on public policy grounds. See, e.g., Merlaud v. Nat’l Metro. Bank, 84 F.2d 238,
240 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Skinner v. Morrow, 318 S.W.2d 419, 429 (Ky. 1958); Carey v. Thieme,
64 A.2d 394, 398 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949); In re Lynch’s Estate, 276 N.Y.S. 939, 943-44
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probate’s transparency by examining court files to confirm the size
of an estate and a prospective borrower’s stake in it.151 In addition,
IFC took a page from other fringe financiers. Like these companies,
IFC justified its existence by explaining that it could be a source of
emergency funds, and it was careful not to describe its products as
“loans.”152
IFC was also influenced by the meteoric rise of litigation lend-
ing.153 In the late 1980s, firms began to make cash payments to
plaintiffs with pending civil complaints in exchange for a percentage
of any future recovery.154 These arrangements are nonrecourse: if
the plaintiff wins or settles, the company takes a cut, but if the
(Sur. Ct. 1935); In re Estate of Rice, 193 N.E.2d 566, 571 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1963); In re
McIlwain’s Estate, 27 Pa. D. & C. 619, 624-25 (Pa. Orphans’ Ct. 1936). But gradually, most
judges reversed course, recognizing that heir hunters could spare the personal representative
from a costly and time-consuming search when a decedent’s lineage was unclear. See, e.g.,
Gunning v. Caudill (In re Estate of Wright), 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572, 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(enforcing heir hunting contract); Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1266 (Wash. 1995)
(reasoning that heir hunting contracts “may be beneficial rather than harmful in some cases”);
Gertsch v. Int’l Equity Research (In re Estate of Katze-Miller), 463 N.W.2d 853, 860 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1990) (same).
151. See Lazarus, Probate, supra note 18.
152. See McMenamin, supra note 18.
153. For more detail on litigation lending, see Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at
111-18. There is also prodigious literature on the topic. See generally, e.g., JOHN BEISNER ET
AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-
PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES (2009); Michael Abramowicz, On the
Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697 (2005); Terrence Cain, Third Party Funding
of Personal Injury Tort Claims: Keep the Baby and Change the Bathwater, 89 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 11 (2014); Jenna Wims Hashway, Litigation Loansharks: A History of Litigation Lending
and a Proposal to Bring Litigation Advances Within the Protection of Usury Laws, 17 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 750 (2012); Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime
Industry That Has a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83 (2008); Susan
Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be Tamed
Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55 (2004) [hereinafter Martin, Wild West]; Julia
H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615
(2007); Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61 (2011); Yifat Shaltiel
& John Cofresi, Litigation Lending for Personal Needs Act: A Regulatory Framework to
Legitimatize Third Party Litigation Finance, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 347 (2004); Paul
Bond, Comment, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1297 (2002); Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529 (1996); Jason
Lyon, Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation, 58
UCLA L. REV. 571 (2010); Mattathias Schwartz, Should You Be Allowed to Invest in a
Lawsuit?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/magazine/
should-you-be-allowed-to-invest-in-a-lawsuit.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9AKM-95WJ].
154. See, e.g., Martin, Wild West, supra note 153, at 55; McLaughlin, supra note 153, at
618-20. 
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plaintiff loses, the company receives nothing.155 Because funders
bear so much risk, they usually deal themselves a slice of the plain-
tiff ’s damages that makes their markup on the principal equivalent
to a 100 percent APR.156
The litigation lending model was especially appealing to IFC
because it exploits a loophole in traditional consumer protection
regulation. As noted, usury laws and the TILA govern “loans.”157 In
many jurisdictions, “loan” is a term of art that means a transaction
that saddles the debtor with “an absolute obligation to repay the
principal.”158 Arguably, because litigation lenders recover nothing if
the plaintiff loses, the phrase “litigation ‘loans’” is a misnomer.
Because the company’s recovery hinges “upon a bona fide contin-
gency,”159 most courts have held that litigation loans do not fall
under the auspices of usury laws and the TILA.160 IFC mimicked
155. See, e.g., MoneyForLawsuits V LP v. Rowe, No. 10-cv-11537, 2012 WL 1068760, at *4-
5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2012), aff ’d sub nom. Money for Lawsuits V LP v. Rowe, 570 F. App’x
442 (6th Cir. 2014).
156. See Martin Merzer, Cash-Now Promise of Lawsuit Loans Under Fire, FOX BUS. (Mar.
6, 2016), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/cash-now-promise-lawsuit-loans-under-fire/
[https://perma.cc/4N2E-JXWU]; cf. Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., No. 20523,
2001 WL 1339487, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2001) (involving litigation funding contracts
with APRs of 180 percent and 280 percent), aff ’d, 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003).
157. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
158. Walker & Assocs. Surveying, Inc. v. Roberts, 306 S.W.3d 839, 850 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010)
(quoting First Bank v. Tony’s Tortilla Factory, Inc., 877 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. 1994)); see also
Blackwell Ford, Inc. v. Calhoun, 555 N.W.2d 856, 859 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
159. Stuback v. Sussman, 8 N.Y.S.2d 141, 142 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff’d, 10 N.Y.S.2d 240 (App.
Div. 1939), aff’d, 23 N.E.2d 544 (N.Y. 1939).
160. See, e.g., MoneyForLawsuits V LP, 2012 WL 1068760, at *4-5; Dopp v. Yari, 927 F.
Supp. 814, 823 (D.N.J. 1996); In re Transcapital Fin. Corp., 433 B.R. 900, 910 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 2010); Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Kraft
v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 260 Ill. App. 333,
361 (App. Ct. 1931); Nyquist v. Nyquist, 841 P.2d 515, 518 (Mont. 1992); Anglo-Dutch Petrole-
um Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 98 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). As I will discuss in further
depth, see infra text accompanying notes 305-10, courts have made an exception for cases in
which a plaintiff is virtually certain to be successful. In the last three years, policymakers
have rushed to fill this regulatory lacuna. Arkansas, Indiana, and Tennessee passed statutes
capping APRs on litigation loans. See ARK. CONST. amend. LXXXIX, § 3; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-
57-104, 4-57-109(b) (2017) (17 percent); IND. CODE §§ 24-4.5-1-201.1, 24-4.5-3-508(2) (2017)
(roughly 36 percent); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-16-110(a) (2017) (roughly 10 percent per year).
In addition, eight state legislatures and one jurisdiction’s supreme court have required
litigation lenders to conspicuously disclose their fees and repayment schedules to prospective
clients. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-57-109(c); IND. CODE § 24-12-4-1; ME. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 12-104
(2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-3303 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55(B) (West 2017);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-16-106(b)(1); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 2253 (2017); Oasis Legal Fin. Grp.,
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this arrangement by making its advances nonrecourse: heirs and
beneficiaries had no obligation to reimburse the company if the
estate declined in value or was consumed by creditors or misman-
agement.161
By the early 2000s, IFC was thriving. It made about five hundred
probate loans and earned $5 million in revenue each year.162 Soon
it found itself competing with rivals such as Advance-Direct.com
and Inheritance Now.163
But in 2004, these companies attracted some unwanted attention.
David Lazarus, a columnist who specializes in consumer issues,
published an exposé of the fledgling industry in the San Francisco
Chronicle.164 Lazarus highlighted the fact that Heir Buyout Com-
pany, an IFC knock-off, had recently sent an unsolicited letter tout-
ing its services to thousands of people who were grieving the recent
loss of a loved one.165 This aggressive marketing struck a discordant
note with California lawmakers, who observed that probate lending
“seems predatory on its face.”166
A year later, the state legislature passed “a first-of-its-kind at-
tempt to regulate the probate purchase industry.”167 This legislation,
which became Probate Code section 11604.5, contains three core
mandates. First, it requires probate loans to be in at least ten-point
font and include the amount of the assignment, the sum paid to the
borrower, and the fees and costs charged by the lender.168 Second, it
LLC v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 400, 410 (Colo. 2015) (holding that litigation loans are subject to
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code); cf. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 160:75-9-1(a) (2017) (providing
a model contract for lenders to use). Finally, in early 2017, the CFPB filed complaints against
three high-profile litigation lenders, “signal[ing] that it is investigating the industry and
intends to rein in excesses.” Alison Frankel, CFPB Signals Regulation of Litigation Funding
Industry, REUTERS (Feb. 8, 2017, 6:49 PM), https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-otc-litfunding-
idUSKBN15N2W1 [https://perma.cc/U28B-73DB].
161. See Lazarus, Probate, supra note 18.
162. Id.
163. See id.; McMenamin, supra note 18.
164. See Lazarus, Sorry for Your Loss, supra note 18.
165. See id.
166. See Lazarus, Probate, supra note 18 (statement of California Assemblyman Tom
Harman).
167. CAL. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 390 (2005).
168. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 11604.5(d)-(f) (West 2017). The statute only governs people or
entities that “regularly engage[ ] in the purchase of beneficial interests in estates for consider-
ation.” Id. § 11604.5(b)(2). It excludes assignments made to heir hunters, or to the decedent’s
family, or to other heirs and beneficiaries. See id. § 11604.5(c).
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dictates that lenders must lodge their agreements with heirs and
beneficiaries in the judicial record no more than thirty days after
they are signed.169 Third, it gives courts the power to scrutinize
probate loans for fairness:
The court may refuse to order distribution under the written
agreement, or may order distribution on any terms that the
court considers equitable, if the court finds that the [probate
lender] did not substantially comply with the requirements of
this section, or if the court finds that ... [t]he fees, charges, or
consideration paid or agreed to be paid by the beneficiary were
grossly unreasonable.170
Despite this intervention, probate lending continued to expand. IFC
now reports that it has advanced more than $100 million to heirs
and beneficiaries.171 Scores of copycat companies have emerged, in-
cluding Advance Inheritance (AI),172 HBS Finance,173 HAC,174 Inheri-
tance Advance,175 and Key National Funding.176 Nevertheless, we
know virtually nothing about these firms. Indeed, since Lazarus’s
articles and the passage of the California statute, no reporter, schol-
ar, or policymaker had mentioned inheritance-purchasing firms
again.
In Probate Lending, my colleague Andrea Cann Chandrasekher
and I took up the gauntlet.177 Our article’s centerpiece was a hand-
collected dataset of all 594 testate and intestate administrations
stemming from deaths that occurred in 2007 in Alameda County,
California.178 Thanks to the disclosure mandate in section 11604.5,
169. See id. § 11604.5(d)(1).
170. Id. § 11604.5(h).
171. Who We Are, INHERITANCE FUNDING, http://www.inheritancefunding.com/who-we-are
[https://perma.cc/3TSN-8ETX].
172. Why Should We Need to Hire an Inheritance Funding Company?, ADVANCE IN-
HERITANCE, LLC, http://advanceinheritance.blogspot.com/2015/03/why-should-we-need-to-hire-
inheritance.html [https://perma.cc/HW8Y-MLBP]. 
173. HBS FIN., http://www.probateestateloans.com [https://perma.cc/3URD-H5VH].
174. HEIR ADVANCE CO., http://www.heiradvance.com [https://perma.cc/TLF9-ETR2].
175. INHERITANCE ADVANCE, http://www.inheritanceadvance.com [https://perma.cc/SYP6-
YWDE].
176. KEY NAT’L FUNDING, LLC, http://www.inheritancemoney.com [https://perma.cc/93SQ-
MF46].
177. Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22.
178. See id. at 130-31. 
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we unearthed seventy-seven loans in thirty cases.179 Because the
advances in our sample were fully repaid 96 percent of the time, we
argued that they were “absolutely repayable” and therefore should
trigger usury laws and the TILA.180 In addition, we claimed that
probate lenders routinely violate these laws.181 For instance, al-
though California’s usury limit is 10 percent, we did not find a sin-
gle probate loan with an APR below that ceiling.182 Thus, we argued
that this multimillion dollar industry is built on a foundation of
sand.183 
But Probate Lending was just a conversation starter. Because it
merely sought to christen the debate about inheritance-buying
firms, it left many questions unanswered. Is probate lending Calif-
ornia-specific, or does it happen throughout the country? Is the
market shrinking or expanding? Are the high repayment rates and
APRs in our data an aberration? Moreover, the study’s relatively
small sample size means that it only provides a snapshot of the
information that courts and policymakers need in order to decide
whether (and how) to regulate this burgeoning industry. Accord-
ingly, as I explain in the next Part, I expanded the scope of my re-
search.
II. EMPIRICALLY ASSESSING PROBATE LOANS
This Part first discusses how I collected and analyzed my data. It
then presents my findings about (1) the probate lending industry,
179. See id. at 132-33.
180. See id. at 143, 147-48.
181. See id. at 144, 149.
182. See id. at 145 tbl.3; see also CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1.
183. We also analyzed whether probate lending is champertous. See Horton & Chand-
rasekher, supra note 22, at 155-67. To discourage frivolous litigation, the ancient champerty
doctrine prohibits third parties from acquiring an interest in a pending complaint. See, e.g.,
Lampet’s Case (1613) 77 Eng. Rep. 994, 997-98; 10 Co. Rep. 46 a, 48 a. We discovered that
probate lenders do, in fact, often initiate litigation. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note
22, at 157-60. Nevertheless, we noted that these claims often seek to remove or surcharge a
poorly performing personal representative and thus seem to benefit the estate and the other
heirs and beneficiaries. See id. at 161-62. Accordingly, we concluded that probate lending
should not be champertous. See id. at 162. Bizarrely, Professor Kidd faults Probate Lending
for failing to “prove that probate funders are overly litigious” and ignoring the fact that “the
results could just as easily be evidence of probate [lenders] making the process more efficient.”
Kidd, Response, supra note 25, at 15. I am not sure how to defend the article from the
accusation that it should have reached the conclusion that it actually did reach.
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(2) why heirs and beneficiaries might borrow against their inheri-
tances, (3) repayment and interest rates, and (4) how parties have
used California’s probate lending statute.
A. Methodology
As noted, Probate Lending was based on a dataset of every estate
administration that stemmed from deaths that occurred in 2007 in
Alameda County, California.184 This racially and economically di-
verse region, which sits just east of San Francisco, boasts a popula-
tion of about 1.6 million.185 It includes wealthy enclaves in the
Berkeley Hills, suburbs such as Hayward, and dilapidated urban
sections of Oakland.
I collected this sample through DomainWeb, an online resource
that allows users to access court files.186 During my initial research
pass, I used the “date search” function to examine every case that
appeared on the probate court calendar between January 1, 2008,
and March 1, 2009. To ensure a common denominator, I cut long-
running cases by limiting my sample to decedents who passed away
in 2007. I also eliminated matters that were not relevant to probate
lending, such as guardianships, trust administrations, and matters
involving “pour-over” wills.187
For this Article, I mimicked my initial data-collection procedures
as closely as possible.188 Research assistants took a first crack at
184. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 130-31.
185. See QuickFacts: Alameda County, California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.
census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/alamedacountycalifornia/PST045216 [https://perma.cc/
8QCC-Y7GE]. Professor Kidd complains that Probate Lending does not acknowledge that the
population of Alameda County is not representative of either California or the United States.
See Kidd, Response, supra note 25, at 10. First, with all due respect, this is not a fair reading
of the article. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 132 (acknowledging that “[i]t
is hard to know whether this ratio [of loans to estates] is representative of the national mar-
ket” and “that borrowing against an estate may be less common in other regions”). Second,
Professor Kidd does not explain why any of the minor differences he identifies could influence
the prevalence of loans, repayment amounts, or APRs. See Kidd, Response, supra note 25.
186. DomainWeb, SUPERIOR CT. CAL., CTY. ALAMEDA, http://www.alameda.courts.ca.gov/
pages.aspx/domainweb [https://perma.cc/ZKF8-7QY9]. Data on file with author.
187. A pour-over will transmits assets to the decedent’s trust. See MICHAEL J. GAU, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION 61 (2005). Because there are no
individual beneficiaries of such a will, they cannot lead to probate loans.
188. When I first began using DomainWeb for research in 2014, the website made all
filings in testate and intestate probate administrations available for free. Unfortunately, it
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moving day by day through the probate court docket, starting on
March 1, 2009, and ending on December 31, 2010. When they found
a testate or intestate administration—cases that might involve
probate loans—they recorded the information on a spreadsheet. I
then accessed the case file and recorded about ten variables from it,
including whether there was a probate loan, when the matter open-
ed and closed, the value of the decedent’s property, and whether liti-
gation occurred. Together, my original and supplemental research
yielded 2100 estates. I will refer to this as my “combined dataset.”
I created a second spreadsheet for the cases that featured probate
loans. This document contains the dates and amounts of each ad-
vance, the identity of the lender and borrower, and repayment infor-
mation. I then calculated the effective APR on each loan. I did so by
using the following formula, where A is the amount ultimately
received by the lender, B is the amount of the advance, and C is the
number of days between the loan and the repayment189:
My APR calculations are conservative in two respects. First, com-
panies frequently offer a small rebate—usually about 10 percent—if
the estate closes by a particular deadline.190 Sixty-three loans (22
soon began limiting access to the right half of all documents and charging users about one
dollar per page to download the entire page. See How This Site Works, SUPERIOR CT. CAL.,
CTY. ALAMEDA, https://publicrecords.alameda.courts.ca.gov/PRS/Home/HowThisSiteWorks
[https://perma.cc/LAU4-3QUP]. Thus, I was not able to gather as much information as I did
in my initial Alameda County projects. For example, unlike my initial data-collection pass,
the research I conducted for this Article does not exclude decedents who passed away before
2007. 
189. For example, suppose a borrower received $20,000 and the lender collected $30,000
when the case closed 400 days later. I took raw markup ($30,000 - $20,000 = $10,000), divided
it by the number of days until repayment (400), which equals the daily amount of interest
(here, $25). Multiplying that by 365 gives the raw yearly markup ($9125). Finally, dividing
that result by the amount of the advance expresses it as a percentage of the original loan
(here, 9125/20,000 = 0.46, or 46 percent). This is the same formula we used in Probate
Lending. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 144 n.245.
190. See id. at 133 n.180. In re Estate of Perry is a typical case. See No. HP08426199 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2008) (DomainWeb). On June 25, 2010, a beneficiary sold a $28,000 slice
of the decedent’s property to AI for $20,000. See Second Assignment of Beneficial Interest in
Decedent’s Estate; Declaration of Compliance: Proof of Serv. at 1, In re Estate of Perry, No.
HP08426199 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 25, 2010) (DomainWeb). However, the contract also
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percent) in the combined dataset qualified for an early payment
markdown. Nevertheless, even when a case met this benchmark,
lenders almost always pocketed the entire amount of the assignment
from the probate court.191 I will assume that companies honor their
promised discounts through some kind of private, post-distribution
procedure, although I cannot confirm that they do so.
Second, my APR figures omit some instances in which lenders
were repaid early. The California Probate Code allows personal rep-
resentatives to make preliminary distributions of up to half of the
decedent’s property.192 Companies in the combined dataset cashed
out early fifty-six times in thirteen matters. In these cases, I used
the preliminary distribution date—not the final distribution date—
as the termination of the loan, because that was when the lender
recouped its advance. However, companies also occasionally re-
ceived a partial preliminary distribution. For example, in In re
Estate of Musgrove, an heir entered into several agreements, selling
a total of $122,500 of his inheritance.193 The firm then recovered
$110,000 (90 percent of the total assigned amount) on February 5,
2014, and the remaining $12,500 (10 percent of the total assigned
amount) on July 9, 2015.194 I initially considered treating each of
these transactions as separate loans with different APRs.195 But
specified that AI would accept $25,000 if the matter wrapped up before December 30, 2010.
See id.
191. For example, in In re Estate of Wit, a beneficiary sold a $28,000 slice of the decedent’s
property on September 23, 2008, for $20,000. See Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of
Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant
to Prob. Code Section 11604.5; Proofs of Serv. at 4, In re Estate of Wit, No. RP07362504 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Sep. 23, 2008) (DomainWeb). The contract stated that the lender would only collect
$25,000 if the lender was repaid within six months. See id. at 1. Although the lender collected
sometime between November 5, 2008, and January 7, 2009—well within the six-month win-
dow—it received the entire $28,000. See Receipt on Preliminary Distribution at 1, In re Estate
of Wit, No. RP07362504 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 2009) (DomainWeb).
192. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 11623 (West 2017).
193. See Petition for Preliminary Distribution at 4, In re Estate of Musgrove, No. RP
09439944 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2013) (DomainWeb).
194. See Order for Preliminary Distribution at 2, In re Estate of Musgrove, No. RP
09439944 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2014) (DomainWeb); Order on Petition for Attorney’s Fees
to Be Assessed Against Daryl Passmore; Final Report of Former Adm’r & Request for
Statutory & Extraordinary Comp. of Adm’r & Attorney; First & Final Account & Report of
Special Admin. & for Statutory & Extraordinary Comp. & Approval of Fees of Guardian Ad
Litem & for Final Distribution at 4, In re Estate of Musgrove, No. RP09439944 (Cal. Super.
Ct. July 10, 2015) (DomainWeb).
195. To make this concrete, consider the July 2012 agreement in Musgrove, in which the
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that soon made the data unwieldy. Thus, for simplicity’s sake, I
chose to ignore all partial preliminary distributions. As a result,
my APR calculations understate the true return on probate loans.
B. Results
1. The Market for Inheritance Rights
My combined dataset includes 291 probate loans. These agree-
ments were clustered in 93 cases (4.4 percent of all estates).
Although this might not seem like a striking finding, it is important
to note that there are tens of millions of probate matters every year
in the United States.196 If anything close to this estate-to-loan ratio
holds outside of Alameda County, then there is a booming market
for inheritance rights.
Overall, companies took home $4,963,897 in return for $3,033,
400. The average span between the assignment and repayment was
469 days, which makes the mean APR 50 percent.
lender received $23,800 and paid $12,500. See Von Roderick Passmore’s Assignment #1, Sale
& Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate to Inheritance Funding Co., Inc. at 1,
In re Estate of Musgrove, No. RP09439944 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 9, 2012) (DomainWeb). To
accurately reflect the transaction’s value and duration, I would have needed to treat it as (1)
a loan of $21,480 (90 percent of the assigned amount) in return for $11,250 (90 percent of the
payment to the heir) that was repaid on February 2, 2014, and (2) a loan of $2380 (10 percent
of the assigned amount) in return for $1250 (10 percent of the payment to the heir) that was
repaid on July 9, 2015.
196. See John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2042 n.5 (1994) (book
review).
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Table 1. Probate Loan Descriptive Statistics (Combined
Datasets)197
Mean
(SD) Median Min Max N
Days from
Loan Until 
Repayment
469
(361) 349 19 1479 285
Amount that
Borrower 
Received
(Principal)
$10,569
($10,338) $7,000 $2,000 $100,000 287
Amount that
Company 
Received 
(Principal
Plus Inter-
est)
$17,296
($16,989) $11,900 $0 $162,944 287
Revisiting the Alameda County files helps clarify the contours
of the industry. In Probate Lending, we observed that the over-
whelming majority of probate lenders are headquartered in Cal-
ifornia.198 Thus, we admitted that one might wonder whether the
phenomenon is regional, rather than national.199 However, when I
reviewed my initial data and conducted my supplemental research,
I recorded a new variable: the state in which the borrower lives.
Although this information was only available for about half of the
loans, I found heirs and beneficiaries from Arkansas,200 Arizona,201
197. The first row of Table 1 excludes two loans that were not repaid at all: one “pure
principal” loan in which the lender chose not to try to collect interest from the borrower, and
four loans that did not contain required information under Probate Code section 11604.5. The
second and third rows exclude the pure principal loan and the four loans with defective
disclosures.
198. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 128-29. As noted above, the GAO
found that a large number of pension lenders were located in California. See supra notes 132-
33 and accompanying text. It is unclear why so many probate and pension lenders hail from
the Golden State.
199. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 128-29, 132.
200. See, e.g., Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5;
Proofs of Serv. at 3, In re Estate of Sadler, No. RP08378213 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 2008)
(DomainWeb).
201. See, e.g., Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5;
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Florida,202 Georgia,203 Idaho,204 Iowa,205 North Carolina,206 Oklaho-
ma,207 Oregon,208 Texas,209 and Virginia.210 This geographical di-
versity suggests that inheritance selling occurs throughout the
country.
My research also seems to have captured a market in flux. Figure
1 shows the aggregate value of sales per company. It reveals that
IFC remains the powerhouse, capturing 65 percent of the total
revenue from probate loans. Yet there are also signs of increased
Proof of Serv. at 3, In re Estate of Costello, No. RP09440395 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 27, 2009)
(DomainWeb).
202. See, e.g., Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5;
Proofs of Serv. at 3, In re Estate of Thaler, No. RP08401139 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2009)
(DomainWeb).
203. See, e.g., Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5;
Proof of Serv. at 3, In re Estate of Henderson, No. RP09435869 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 21, 2010)
(DomainWeb) [hereinafter Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in
Decedent’s Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights].
204. See, e.g., Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5;
Proofs of Serv. at 3, In re Estate of Kerrigan, No. HP08396950 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2008)
(DomainWeb).
205. See, e.g., Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5;
Proofs of Serv. at 3, In re Estate of Ballard, No. RP08423495 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2009)
(DomainWeb).
206. See Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5;
Proof of Serv. at 3, In re Estate of Nelson, No. VP08423420 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 2010)
(DomainWeb).
207. See, e.g., Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5;
Proof of Serv. at 3, In re Estate of Silva, No. RP10494837 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 28, 2010)
(DomainWeb).
208. See, e.g., Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5;
Proofs of Serv., supra note 191, at 3.
209. See, e.g., Agreement for Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest, Assignment & Waiver
of Disclaimer Rights of Cheryl I. Nelson; Declaration Attesting to Satisfaction of Prob. Code
Section 11604.5; Proof of Serv. at 8, In re Estate of Nelson, No. VP08423420 (Cal. Super. Ct.
July 16, 2010) (DomainWeb).
210. See, e.g., Agreement for Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest, Assignment & Waiver
of Disclaimer Rights of Suanne M. Brady; Declaration Attesting to Satisfaction of Prob. Code
Section 11604.5; Proof of Serv. at 8, In re Estate of Barr, No. HP08379816 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Oct. 7, 2008) (DomainWeb) [hereinafter Agreement for Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest,
Assignment & Waiver of Disclaimer Rights of Suanne M. Brady].
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competition: although there were only six lenders in my original
dataset,211 my supplemental research uncovered four new firms.212
Figure 1. Market Share
2. Characteristics of Estates with Loans
One of the most fraught issues in the fringe lending debate is why
consumers enter into these transactions.213 Does the decision to bor-
row on such unfavorable terms stem from a lack of self-control, or
do customers use fringe products to cover emergencies or to make
ends meet? The same question has important consequences for pro-
bate lending. This Subsection examines my data for clues about the
211. They are Accelerated Inheritance, AI, Heir Buyout Company, IFC, Jon Freeman, and
KeyNational Funding, LLC. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 132 n.178.
212. They are Approved Cash Advance, American Asset Finance LLC, HAC, and Law
Finance Group, Inc. 
213. See supra Part I.A. 
2018] BORROWING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH 2483
factors that might motivate heirs and beneficiaries to borrow
against their inheritances.
People might enter into probate loans for several reasons. First,
they might do so out of frustration with probate’s notorious de-
lays.214 This would mean that loans would arise in cases with longer
durations. Second, because conflict can derail the administrative
process, loans could be more common in estates that have degener-
ated into litigation.215 Third, as with RALs and payday loans, people
in lower income brackets might borrow to bridge a financial gap.216
Unfortunately, my research does not allow me to measure the econo-
mic status of heirs and beneficiaries. The best proxy I have for this
variable is the total value of the decedent’s property, which might
roughly reflect the financial standing of her friends and family.217
Fourth, loans could be associated with estates that lack liquid
assets. Often, a decedent’s most valuable possession will be her
home.218 But when such an individual dies, her loved ones will not
receive a penny until they take the additional time-step of selling
the residence.219 Thus, assigning inheritance rights might be more
prevalent in estates that consist largely of real property. Fifth, in
Probate Lending, we discovered that loans were correlated with (1)
intestacies and (2) matters in which banks or credit card companies
filed creditors’ claims against the decedent.220
214. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
215. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 156-58.
216. See supra notes 61, 101 and accompanying text. 
217. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 135.
218. Admittedly, this may be particularly true in Northern California, which has a repu-
tation for high real estate values. Emmie Martin, The 25 Most Expensive Housing Markets in
the US, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 8, 2016, 3:05 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/most-
expensive-housing-markets-in-the-us-2016-9 [https://perma.cc/VZ5M-V8W6]. For example, the
total amount of wealth that passed through probate in my combined dataset was
$1,007,857,478. Real property accounted for $718,615,960, or about three-fourths of that sum. 
219. See Horton, In Partial Defense, supra note 23, at 639; Horton & Chandrasekher, supra
note 22, at 163 n.319.
220. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 136, 163. Professor Kidd speculates
that heirs and beneficiaries might assign their rights for emotional reasons. As he puts it,
“Given the cause of a probate dispute—death of someone who was an important person in the
heir[ or beneficiary]’s life—a reasonable [person] could legitimately want some distance from
probate.” Kidd, Funding, supra note 25, at 7. This theory is not convincing. For one, because
heirs and beneficiaries do not actively participate in probate, it is unclear how opting out of
the process would insulate them from reminders of their deceased loved one. But even more
importantly, the desire to wash one’s hands of probate completely would only explain as-
signments of a person’s entire interest in the estate. None of the contracts in my data fit this
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I began testing these hypotheses by examining the raw data. As
Table 2 reveals, I found that estates with loans deviated from their
loanless counterparts in a few statistically significant ways. For one,
the mean case length was longer in the loan subsample (739 days to
577 days) (p < 0.001). In addition, as in Probate Lending, loans were
more common if (1) the decedent died intestate (p < 0.05) or (2) a
bank or a credit card company sought to collect a debt from the
decedent (p < 0.01).221 Conversely, cases with loans were indistin-
guishable from other matters in several respects. Although they
boasted a higher mean value ($670,035 versus $572,077), and fea-
tured a greater proportion of both (1) litigation (17 percent to 10
percent) and (2) illiquid estates (58 percent to 47 percent), none of
these differences were statistically meaningful.
description.
221. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 136, 163. 
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Table 2. Estate Characteristics
Estates with Loans Estates WithoutLoans
Average Case 
Length (Days) 739*** 577
Litigation1 17% 10%
Total Value $670,035 $572,077
Illiquid Estate2 58% 47%
Testacy 41%* 54%
Bank Claim3 37%*** 17%
Total4 90 1677
Notes:
1. For estates without loans, I defined “litigation” as any matter in which a petition
sparked an objection from an adverse party. For estates with loans, I defined “litigation”
as any matter in which a party objected before the first loan was signed. That is,
“litigation” excludes estates in which a loan was issued and then a dispute arose. I
classified cases this way because I wanted to test the hypothesis that heirs and
beneficiaries are more likely to seek the services of a lender when conflict has already
derailed the probate process. 
2. An “illiquid estate” consists of 90 percent or more of real property and 0 otherwise. 
3. A “bank claim” occurs when a bank or credit card company sought to collect a debt from
the estate.
4. I dropped 333 estates because they were missing variables.
5. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
2486 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2447
To excavate further, I ran a linear probability regression analysis.
My dependent variable was whether a case contained at least one
probate loan, and my independent variables were those mentioned
above. As Table 3 reveals, the only statistically significant correlates
of estates with loans were (1) case length222 and (2) the fact that a
bank or credit card company filed a claim against the estate.223
222. Our regression in Probate Lending did not find that longer cases were linked to loans.
See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 137. The raw data helps pinpoint the root of
this discrepancy. For whatever reason, the mean length of cases with loans in the Probate
Lending sample was 684.5 days, see id. at 133, whereas matters with loans in my sup-
plemental research here lasted an average of 759 days.
223. As mentioned above, I was unable to collect as much data for this Article as I was for
Probate Lending. See supra note 188. Thus, this Article’s regression analysis does not include
the number of times lawyers appeared in court: a factor that Probate Lending found to in-
crease the odds of a loan. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 135 n.189, 137 tbl.2.
Arguably, however, counting attorney appearances is just another way of measuring case
duration. Because this Article unearthed a link between longer cases and loans, omitting the
attorney appearance variable probably makes little difference. In addition, this regression
analysis does not control for two characteristics that Probate Lending discovered did not affect
the likelihood of a loan in a statistically significant fashion: the date of the will and the
decedent’s marital status. See id.
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Table 3. Correlates of Probate Loans: Linear Probability Model
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Average Case Length (Days) 0.00*(0.00)
Litigation 0.01(0.03)
Total Value of Estate (in $1,000s) 0.00(0.00)
Illiquid Estate -0.02(0.01)
Testate -0.02(0.01)
Bank Claim Filed 0.06**(0.02)
Constant 0.04(0.01)
N 1,767
Adj. R2 0.021
Notes:
1. I defined each variable in the regression analysis the same way as I defined it in
Table 2’s bivariate analysis.
2. I excluded 333 observations from the regression because they were missing variables.
3. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
These results are both intuitive and surprising. On the one hand,
the idea that every passing day of the probate matter increases an
heir or a beneficiary’s impatience (and thus the odds of a loan)
makes sense. But the link between creditors’ claims and assign-
ments of inheritance rights—which was also present in the smaller
sample that I used to cowrite Probate Lending224—is more mysteri-
ous. It might be a tantalizing sign that there is a “culture of debt”
in which decedents who borrow also have loved ones who borrow.225
224. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 135. In both the original and
combined datasets, the likelihood of a loan was 6 percentage points higher in cases where a
bank or credit card company filed a claim against the estate. See id.
225. See David Brooks, The Culture of Debt, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2008), http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/07/22/opinion/22brooks.html [https://perma.cc/W6G4-X48J].
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Likewise, because credit card liability is more common among those
lower on the economic totem pole,226 it could also be an echo of the
fact that probate lenders—like RAL providers and payday
lenders—cater to poorer Americans.
3. Repayment and Interest Rates
As mentioned above, both usury laws and the TILA only apply to
advances that are likely to be repaid.227 Thus, one of Probate
Lending ’s most important findings was that lenders recouped the
funds that they fronted 96 percent of the time.228 My research in this
Article reveals that this was no aberration. As Table 4 reveals,
lenders collected the full amount due—both principal and inter-
est—on 97.5 percent of their loans.
Table 4. Repayment Rates (Combined Datasets)
N Percent
Fully Repaid 
(Principal Plus 
Interest) 
278 97.5%
Partially Repaid (Lender
Gain) 2 0.7%
Partially Repaid (Lender
Loss) 3 1%
Completely 
Unrepaid 2 0.7%
Total 285 100%
My combined dataset also confirms that probate lenders are
virtually guaranteed returns that would be illegal in the context of
conventional loans.229 As Figure 2 shows, more than 99 percent of
226. See TAMARA DRAUT & JAVIER SILVA, D?MOS, BORROWING TO MAKE ENDS MEET: THE
GROWTH OF CREDIT CARD DEBT IN THE ’90S 10 (2003), http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-
BorrowingMakeEndsMeetGrowthCreditCardDebt90s-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R3X-JDRS].
227. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
228. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 143.
229. See id. at 144-45.
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the loans that were at least partially repaid resulted in APRs above
California’s 10 percent usury threshold. In fact, 101 loans (36.0
percent) boasted rates of over 100 percent, and 49 (18.9 percent)
topped 200 percent.
Figure 2. APRs
4. Judicial Intervention
Recall that California Probate Code section 11604.5 allows judges
to strike down “grossly unreasonable” probate loans.230 No party in
the Probate Lending dataset tried to use this safeguard.231 However,
the statute arose twice in the supplemental research I conducted for
this Article. This Subsection briefly describes these cases.
Section 11604.5 first arose in one of the rare matters in which a
lender did not recover the full amount of its markup. In In re Estate
of Matthews, the decedent’s only asset was her home, which was
encumbered by a $23,000 tax lien.232 To prevent the government
230. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 11604.5(h) (West 2017).
231. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 138. 
232. See Second Amended First & Final Account & Report of Adm’r & Petition for Its
Settlement, for Allowance of Comp. for Ordinary & Extraordinary Servs. & for Final
Distribution at 5-6, In re Estate of Matthews, No. RP-09-441460 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 14,
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from seizing the property, the decedent’s daughter, Yvonne, bor-
rowed $42,000 from AI in return for a $75,000 share of the estate.233
However, the value of the house then plummeted from $576,000 to
$410,000.234 As a result, Yvonne stood to inherit roughly $49,000,
which was not enough to cover the amount she owed to AI.235
Louis Matthews, the decedent’s son, then spotted a lurking issue:
either Yvonne or AI could argue that they were entitled to be
reimbursed from the estate for the $23,000 lien payment because it
exonerated one of the decedent’s debts.236 In turn, this would reduce
the pot of money to be divided among the other heirs. Thus, Louis
filed a petition asking the court to rule that Yvonne had paid the
lien to further her own interests.237 As a fallback argument, Louis
asked the judge to reduce the amount that Yvonne owed to AI, citing
section 11604.5 and asserting without elaborating that the statute
“empower[s] the Court ... to determine [a loan’s] reasonableness.”238
The court denied the request.239 Although the judge did not explain
his decision, it might have reflected the fact that AI recovered only
$48,668.63 (rather than $75,000), making the APR a modest 8
percent.240
The second section 11604.5 case was In re Estate of Ellis.241
Barbara Ellis died intestate, survived by her husband, Weldon, and
2011) (DomainWeb) [hereinafter Matthews, Petition for Final Distribution]; Objection to First
& Final Account & Petition for Distribution at 1-2, In re Estate of Matthews, No. RP09441460
(Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2010) (DomainWeb) [hereinafter Matthews, Objection].
233. See Matthews, Objection, supra note 232, at 1-2.
234. See Matthews, Petition for Final Distribution, supra note 232, at 4.
235. See id. at 10.
236. See Matthews, Objection, supra note 232, at 1-2.
237. See id. at 2.
238. Id.
239. See Order on Second Amended First & Final Account & Report of Adm’r & Petition
for Its Settlement, for Allowance of Comp. for Ordinary & Extraordinary Servs. & for Final
Distribution at 2-3, In re Estate of Matthews, No. RP-09-441460 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2011)
(DomainWeb).
240. See id. at 2.
241. See Petition for Letters of Admin., In re Estate of Ellis, No. RP10533555 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Aug. 27, 2010) (DomainWeb) [hereinafter Ellis, Petition for Letters]; see also Third Supple-
ment to First & Final Account & Report & Response to Prob. Exam’r’s Notes at 3, In re Estate
of Ellis, No. RP10533555 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 1, 2013) (DomainWeb) [hereinafter Ellis, Third
Supplement].
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seven adult children, including her son, Kenya, who was mentally
retarded.242 Barbara’s only asset was her house.243
Shortly after the probate case began, Barbara’s heirs began to
fight about who should serve as personal representative.244 This
dispute pitted Barbara’s daughter Cynthia, who, along with Kenya,
had been living with Barbara and not paying rent, against Weldon
and several other kids.245 By the time the court resolved the issue,
it was April 2011.246 Although Barbara’s estate had been pending for
a year, it had not begun the slow march through the administrative
process. Making matters worse, because Barbara’s only possession
was her residence, it needed to be sold within probate to avoid
thrusting the warring factions of her family into the awkward role
of co-owners.247
As the delays mounted, Barbara’s heirs began to enter into pro-
bate loans. Weldon assigned $16,100 of his share of the estate to
IFC in return for $8000 cash.248 Barbara’s son, Donald, and daugh-
ter, Yolanda, entered into similar arrangements, each giving IFC
$8800 of their expected inheritances in exchange for $5000 each.249
Finally, Barbara’s daughter Benita took the mentally impaired Ken-
ya to a different probate lender, Inheritance Loan Company (ILC),
where they both sold $9500 of their inheritance rights for $7000
242. See Ellis, Third Supplement, supra note 241, at 3; Ellis, Petition for Letters, supra
note 241, at 4.
243. See Ellis, Petition for Letters, supra note 241, at 2.
244. See, e.g., Object Petition at 1, In re Estate of Ellis, No. RP10533555 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Oct. 20, 2010).
245. See Objector’s Declaration in Opposition to Appointment of Adm’r at 1-2, In re Estate
of Ellis, No. RP10533555 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2010) (DomainWeb).
246. The court sided with Cynthia. See Order Appointing Adm’r at 1, In re Estate of Ellis,
No. RP10533555 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 2011) (DomainWeb).
247. See Order Confirming Sale of Real Prop. at 1, In re Estate of Ellis, No. RP10533555
(Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2012) (DomainWeb).
248. See Weldon H. Ellis’s Assignment #1, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Dece-
dent’s Estate to Inheritance Funding Co., Inc. at 1, In re Estate of Ellis, No. RP10533555 (Cal.
Super. Ct. May 20, 2011) (DomainWeb) [hereinafter Weldon H. Ellis’s Assignment #1].
249. See Donald Ellis’s Assignment #1, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate to Inheritance Funding Co., Inc. at 1, In re Estate of Ellis, No. RP10533555 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 2012) (DomainWeb) [hereinafter Ellis, IFC Assignment]; Yolanda Ellis’s
Assignment #1, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate to Inheritance
Funding Co., Inc. at 1, In re Estate of Ellis, No. RP10533555 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 2013)
(DomainWeb).
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each.250 As Figure 3 demonstrates, Kenya misspelled his own first
name on the signature block.251
250. See Benita Ellis’ Assignment #1, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate to Inheritance Loan Co., Inc. at 1, In re Estate of Ellis, No. RP10533555 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Apr. 15, 2013) (DomainWeb); Kenya Ellis’ Assignment #1, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial
Interest in Decedent’s Estate to Inheritance Loan Co., Inc. at 1, In re Estate of Ellis, No.
RP10533555 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2013) (DomainWeb) [hereinafter Ellis, ILC Assignment];
Ellis, Third Supplement, supra note 241, at 3. The paperwork relating to Kenya’s loan is
downright bizarre. Not only is ILC’s name virtually identical to IFC’s, but ILC’s pleadings
were literally copied from an IFC template. Compare Ellis, IFC Assignment, supra note 249,
with Ellis, ILC Assignment, supra. Moreover, the hard copy of ILC’s receipt for distribution
at the end of the case mentions IFC, not ILC. See, e.g., Receipt on Distribution at 1, In re
Estate of Ellis, No. RP10533555 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2014) (DomainWeb). Someone crossed
out the references to IFC and hand-wrote ILC’s information on the page. See id. This potential
link between the two firms could be an eerie echo of the GAO’s finding that many “rival” pen-
sion lenders were actually camouflaged affiliates of each other. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILI-
TY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 15. Of course, it could also be a combination of plagiarism and
sloppiness. Other firms also made mistakes, such as botching their section 11604.5 disclosures
by failing to include the amount paid to the beneficiary. See, e.g., Notice of Assignment, Irrev-
ocable Direction of Payment & Authorization to Release Info. at 8, In re Estate of Fernandez,
No. HP10502002 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 22, 2010) (DomainWeb).
251. Ellis, ILC Assignment, supra note 250, at 3.
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Figure 3. Portions of the First and Last Pages of Kenya Ellis’s
Contract with ILC
Barbara’s personal representative filed a short supplemental brief
that asked the court to invalidate Kenya’s loan under section
11604.5.252 She argued that Kenya lacked the mental capacity to
contract.253 The court set the issue for hearing,254 but ILC mooted
the dispute by limiting its recovery to the $7000 it had advanced to
Kenya, rather than pursuing the full $9500.255
In sum, three years of court records reveal that probate lending
is a profitable business that raises fairness concerns. Yet probate
lending is also anomalous: it is the only form of fringe lending that
252. See Ellis, Third Supplement, supra note 241, at 3.
253. See id. 
254. See Final Distribution, Alameda Cty. Prob. Exam’r Checksheet at 1, In re Estate of
Ellis, No. RP10533555 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 14, 2013) (DomainWeb).
255. See Receipt on Distribution at 1, In re Estate of Ellis, No. RP10533555 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Oct. 7, 2014) (DomainWeb).
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is almost completely unregulated. The next Part argues that this
should change.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This Part uses my data to analyze how the legal system should
address probate lending. It suggests an amendment to California’s
pioneering law and also briefly describes how other state legisla-
tures might address probate lending. It then outlines how courts can
also use usury principles, the TILA, and the contract defense of
unconscionability to limit abuse.
A. Legislation
Dozens of laws address fringe financial products. This regulation
is far-reaching and heavy-hitting: as mentioned, the federal gov-
ernment has stopped just short of outlawing RALs, and thirteen
states have banned payday loans.256 Conversely, only California has
a probate lending statute, and it is rarely invoked.257 This Section
critiques California’s law and outlines ways for policymakers in
other states to get involved.
The first principle in private ordering is that individuals, rather
than the state, best know how to organize their affairs.258 Anyone
seeking to restrict a particular class of transactions between com-
petent adults bears the burden of proving that these exchanges are
plagued by systemic problems.259
Nevertheless, fringe lending is ground zero for allegations of
market failure. A chorus of judges, lawmakers, scholars, and public
interest groups have tried to abolish or limit RALs, payday loans,
256. See supra Part I.A.
257. See CAL. PROB. CODE. § 11604.5 (West 2017); Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22,
at 138.
258. See, e.g., LARRY A. DIMATTEO ET AL., VISIONS OF CONTRACT THEORY: RATIONALITY,
BARGAINING, AND INTERPRETATION 18 (2007) (“[P]rivate bargaining by rational people should,
in light of the Coase Theorem, maximize wealth.”); STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 110
(2004) (“[I]f two persons make a voluntary exchange the exchange will make each better off,
and is therefore efficient.”); cf. Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Ry. Co. v. Brown [1883]
8 AC 703 (HL) 718-19 (reasoning that the fact that two individuals decided to enter into an
exchange “is the strongest possible proof that it is ... reasonable”).
259. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 58-77 (1993).
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and pension loans.260 They claim that these products are predatory,
that borrowers do not understand them, and that even when ac-
curate data is available, consumers suffer from cognitive biases that
prevent them from gauging the costs and benefits.261
Many of these arguments apply with equal force to probate
lending. First, like RALs, payday loans, and pension loans, probate
loans seem unfair. Indeed, the average APR in my sample is five
times the legal limit.262
Second, probate lenders have an enormous informational ad-
vantage over heirs and beneficiaries. They routinely participate in
estate administration, and thus can predict the likely length of a
particular matter. But consumers are unlikely to have been em-
broiled in probate before. This experiential gap can lead to lopsided
bargains. For instance, no knowledgeable person would take out a
probate loan after the personal representative has filed a petition
for final distribution. Because this is the last step in the probate
process, there is only a matter of weeks until the estate closes.
Nevertheless, in my sample, thirteen transactions occurred after
this benchmark. The average APR in these deals was a whopping
315 percent.
Third, like payday loans, which roll over with alarming fre-
quency,263 probate loans have a penchant for snowballing into more
loans. Sixty-five of the 152 heirs and beneficiaries in my sample (43
percent) signed multiple assignments. Some of these borrowing
sprees were egregious. For example, in In re Estate of Chubbuck,
which I mentioned in the Introduction, the decedent’s three daught-
ers entered into a total of twenty-eight probate loans, surrendering
$449,260 of their mother’s legacy in return for $279,500.264 Likewise,
in other cases, several borrowers entered into between four and six
loans each, often waiting only about a month between transac-
tions.265 Thus, some heirs and beneficiaries seem unable to resist the
hypnotic allure of instant access to cash.266
260. See supra Part I.A.
261. See supra Part I.A.
262. See supra Part II.B.1, II.B.3.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95.
264. See Judgment Settling First & Final Account & Report of Admin. Ordering Final
Distribution, Comp. for Servs. Rendered & Reimbursement of Costs, supra note 9, at 4-6.
265. Data on file with author.
266. Although competition can ameliorate concerns about market failure, repeat borrowers
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Fourth, probate lending targets people who are mourning.
Psychologists have discovered that individuals who have recently
lost a loved one exist in a mental fog.267 As one researcher put it,
“[W]hen grieving, consumers do not play an active role in monitor-
ing marketplace transactions ... because of their confused states of
mind.”268 Of course, not every heir or beneficiary experiences a
wrenching loss. Individual relationships vary, and some borrowers
are probably far-flung “laughing heir[s]” who are “so loosely linked
to [their] ancestor as to suffer no sense of bereavement at [their]
loss.”269 Yet because some consumers are emotionally raw, probate
lending has the potential to prey on the vulnerable.
Fifth, probate loans involve comparatively large amounts of mon-
ey. As noted, RALs and payday loans typically involve advance-
ments of a few hundred dollars.270 The average probate loan is for
more than $10,000.271 Thus, heirs and beneficiaries have more at
stake than other borrowers.
Admittedly, probate loans are less problematic in some ways than
other fringe products. RAL and payday loan customers tend to be
disproportionately poor.272 Yet I found no concrete proof that
recipients of probate loans are low on the economic totem pole. The
do not seem to shop among various lenders. One hundred and twenty-eight contracts in my
combined dataset were signed by consumers who had already taken out at least one probate
loan. Yet these individuals virtually never switched lenders. Indeed, 118 repeat borrowers (92
percent) assigned their inheritance rights to just one company. This could be evidence that
firms face minimal pressure to offer lower markups (although, admittedly, it could also
indicate that customers are happy with their initial lender). 
267. Stacey Menzel Baker et al., Building Understanding of the Domain of Consumer
Vulnerability, 25 J. MACROMARKETING 128, 130 (2005) (noting that people who are grieving
“have little desire and ability to act in their best interests”). 
268. James W. Gentry et al., The Vulnerability of Those Grieving the Death of a Loved One:
Implications for Public Policy, 14 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 128, 139 (1995); see also Ter-
rance G. Gabel et al., The Disposal of Consumers: An Exploratory Analysis of Death-Related
Consumption, 23 ADVANCES CONSUMER RESEARCH 361 (1996) (discussing predatory practices
in the funeral services industry).
269. David F. Cavers, Change in the American Family and the “Laughing Heir,” 20 IOWA
L. REV. 203, 208 (1935).
270. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59, 85-88. Admittedly, it appears that some
pension loans are for comparable or even greater amounts. See infra text accompanying notes
340-41.
271. See supra Table 1.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 54, 100-01.
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best proxy for this variable in my data—the decedent’s financial
standing—is inconclusive.273
In addition, RALs, payday loans, and pension loans take a bite
out of a consumer’s income and thus her ability to cover necessities
such as food, shelter, and clothing. Conversely, an advance on an
inheritance depletes a pool of “found money”: a one-time cash in-
fusion that supplements the normal income stream.
Finally, probate lending can be beneficial. As noted, there is a
statistically significant link between sluggish estates and loans.274
This suggests that some clients sell their inheritance rights because
a case has been bogged down in the system. In turn, that makes pro-
bate loans vital for borrowers who desperately need access to cash.
Although I cannot determine what heirs and beneficiaries did with
their advances, I unearthed anecdotal evidence of the funds going
to medical expenses275 and, as mentioned above, in Estate of Mat-
thews, paying off a tax lien to prevent the government from seizing
a family home.276 Thus, a bright-line prohibition on assignments of
inheritance rights would make some heirs and beneficiaries worse
off.
California’s probate lending statute does a good job balancing
these concerns. It wisely allows probate courts to refuse to enforce
lopsided agreements.277 Giving this power to the probate judge, who
already has jurisdiction over the matter, makes more sense than
requiring borrowers to challenge loans through a separate lawsuit.
For example, recall that in In re Estate of Ellis, the personal rep-
resentative was able to unwind the contract between ILC and Kenya
simply by including a short paragraph in a supplemental brief.278 It
is unclear whether anyone would have blown the whistle if they had
needed to file a complaint in civil court.
However, my data also indicate that California’s law does not go
far enough. Although more than one hundred loans featured APRs
273. See supra Part II.B.2. Then again, as I mentioned above, the fact that loans are more
likely in estates with creditors’ claims filed by commercial lenders might be a clue that
borrowers tend to be poor. See supra text accompanying notes 225-26.
274. See supra Part II.B.2. 
275. See Lazarus, Sorry for Your Loss, supra note 18.
276. See Final Distribution, Alameda Cty. Prob. Exam’r Checksheet at 1, In re Estate of
Matthews, No. RP09441460 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2010) (DomainWeb).
277. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 11604(c) (West 2017).
278. See supra notes 252-55 and accompanying text. 
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over 100 percent, just two parties invoked section 11604.5.279 Thus,
the legislature should consider revising the statute to require judi-
cial review of probate loans. Every estate administration culminates
in a petition for final distribution, in which the court ensures that
the personal representative has paid the decedent’s creditors and
managed the decedent’s assets prudently.280 Because court oversight
is the norm, it would only be a small step to ask judges to inquire
into the fairness of each loan. This would create powerful incentives
for lenders to avoid signing multiple loans in quick succession or
locking borrowers into deals with runaway APRs.
In addition, jurisdictions other than California should consider at
least gathering data about probate lending. Because there is no
other disclosure statute on the books, we simply do not know how
far the industry’s tendrils extend. Yet as Probate Lending observed,
some lenders claim to “[o]perate in all 50 states” or “throughout the
USA.”281 Similarly, as this Article has documented, companies pur-
chase rights in Alameda County estates from heirs and beneficiaries
who live all over the map.282 In addition, there are reported cases
involving lenders who acquired interests in estates that were being
probated in Maine,283 New York,284 South Carolina,285 and Utah.286
If probate lending is, in fact, widespread, then policymakers outside
of the Golden State might consider experimenting with their own
versions of section 11604.5.287 
279. See supra Parts II.B.3-4.
280. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 11640.
281. Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 129 & n.162 (alteration in original). 
282. See supra text accompanying notes 200-10.
283. See Metcalf v. State Tax Assessor, 70 A.3d 261, 263 (Me. 2013). 
284. See In re Reid, 942 N.Y.S.2d 176, 177 (App. Div. 2012).
285. See Inheritance Funding Co., Inc. v. Chatman, No. 3:12-cv-1308-JFA, 2013 WL
3946237, at *1 (D.S.C. July 31, 2013).
286. See Cosby v. Cazares, No. 20091035-CA, 2010 WL 3795133, at *1 (Utah Ct. App. Sept.
30, 2010) (per curiam).
287. If states other than California passed probate lending statutes, they would face a
threshold complication: many of the loans in my dataset contain California choice-of-law
clauses. Notably, though, lenders use “narrow” choice of law clauses, which declare that the
contract “is made and shall be interpreted” under California law. See Weldon H. Ellis’s
Assignment #1, supra note 248, at 3; Assignment of Interest in Estate & Declaration
Pursuant to Prob. Code § 11604.5 at 4, In re Estate of Brawner, No. HP07351203 (Cal. Super.
Ct. June 25, 2008) (DomainWeb) (same); see also Second Assignment of Beneficial Interest in
Decedent’s Estate; Declaration of Compliance; Proof of Serv., supra note 190, at 3 (“The
Assignment shall be interpreted under California law.”). It is well settled that “narrow”
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Accordingly, lawmakers should consider regulating probate loans
more aggressively, just as they have been proactive about RALs,
payday loans, and pension loans. But until more states take the
initiative, courts are left with traditional consumer protection laws.
The next two Sections address how these measures apply to probate
loans.
B. Usury Laws and the TILA
Probate lenders may be violating usury laws and the TILA on an
epic scale. The APR on their agreements almost invariably exceeds
the usury ceiling in many states, including California.288 Likewise,
my supplemental research confirmed our finding in Probate Lending
that lenders do not obey TILA’s nitpicky disclosure mandates.289
Although probate lenders have floated two theories about why their
products are not “loans,” this Section explains why these arguments
fail.
First, probate lenders contend that their contracts are not “loans”
because they are other kinds of arrangements. Each agreement
emphasizes that it is an outright sale of the heir or beneficiary’s
property rights.290 Some go further by expressly declaring that they
choice-of-law provisions do not bar statutory claims arising from another state’s laws. See,
e.g., Dollar Sys., Inc. v. Avcar Leasing Sys., Inc., 890 F.2d 165, 171 (9th Cir. 1989). As a result,
these terms would not preclude courts in other states from applying their own probate lending
statutes.
288. See supra Part II.B.3. 
289. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 146-55. For example, the TILA re-
quires creditors to conspicuously disclose “[t]he ‘amount financed’, using that term,” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1638(a)(2)(A) (2012), “[t]he ‘finance charge’, ... using that term,” id. § 1638(a)(3), and “[t]he
finance charge expressed as an ‘annual percentage rate’, using that term,” id. § 1638(a)(4). No
loan in either my research for Probate Lending or my supplemental research for this Article
mentions these matters in its paperwork.
290. See, e.g., Assignment of Interest in Estate & Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code
§ 11604.5 at ex. A at 1, In re Estate of Rios, No. HP07327103 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 2007)
(DomainWeb) (stating that a probate loan is the transfer of “the right to receive a distribution
of a fixed amount of ... [an] estate for an immediate cash payment”).
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are “not a loan,”291 or requiring borrowers to sign a statement that
“in no way do I consider [this transaction to be] a loan.”292
However, this labels-driven assertion is not persuasive. Under
both usury laws and the TILA, courts “disregard the form and look
to the substance of the transaction.”293 For this reason, the vast ma-
jority of jurisdictions have refused to hold that RALs are merely
sales of property rights294 and payday loans are nothing more than
“check-cashing activities.”295 In the same vein, a half dozen regu-
latory bodies and a federal district court have concluded that pen-
sion advances are loans.296 Exactly as in these contexts, it does not
matter what probate loans purport to be. Rather, what counts is the
well-founded expectation that companies will recover their advances
along with an additional markup.
291. Second Agreement for Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest, Assignment & Waiver
of Disclaimer Rights of Catherine L. Sanders; Declaration Attesting to Satisfaction of Prob.
Code Section 11604.5; Proof of Serv. at 2, In re Estate of Barr, No. HP08379816 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Jan. 22, 2009) (DomainWeb) [hereinafter Second Agreement for Sale & Transfer of
Beneficial Interest, Assignment & Waiver of Disclaimer Rights of Catherine L. Sanders].
292. Partial Assignment of Beneficial Interest of Samuel Davis at 5, In re Estate of Davis,
No. RP07347450 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2007) (DomainWeb). Likewise, in Estate of Matthews,
the lender’s objection to the section 11604.5 petition took pains to assert that the deal before
the court was “not a loan.” See Response of Advance Inheritance, LLC to: Objections to First
& Final Account & Petition for Distribution at 2, In re Estate of Matthews, No. RP09441460
(Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2010) (DomainWeb) [hereinafter Matthews, Response] (emphasis
added); see also Kidd, Response, supra note 25, at 5 (asserting that probate loans are merely
the “purchase of a property interest”).
293. Rouse v. Peoples Leasing Co., 638 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Wash. 1982) (quoting German
Sav., Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Leavens, 153 P. 1092 (Wash. 1916)); see also Turner v. E-Z Check
Cashing, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1047 (M.D. Tenn. 1999) (“Because TILA is a remedial act
designed to protect consumers, courts construe it liberally in favor of consumers [and] ... focus
on the substance, not the form, of credit-extending transactions.”); Sw. Concrete Prods. v.
Gosh Constr. Corp., 798 P.2d 1247, 1249 (Cal. 1990) (“In determining whether a transaction
constitutes a loan or forbearance, we look to the substance rather than the form of the trans-
action.”); Victoria Bank & Tr. Co. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 941 (Tex. 1991) (Mauzy, J., con-
curring and dissenting) (“To determine the existence or non-existence of usury, a court should
look beyond a transaction to its substance.” (citing Gonzales Cty. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.
Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. 1976))).
294. See State ex rel. Salazar v. Cash Now Store, Inc., 31 P.3d 161, 165 (Colo. 2001); see
also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
295. Turner, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1048; see also supra note 103 and accompanying text.
296. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Future Income Payments, LLC, 252 F. Supp 3d
961, 967 (C.D. Cal. 2017); cf. In re Stone St. Capital, LLC, No. NOCV2012-01891, 2013 WL
3341052, at *1, *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 10, 2013) (holding that contract in which lottery
winner accepted $40,000 in return for an assignment of $70,000 fell under usury statute even
though the borrower “ha[d] no personal obligation to repay any of the monies advanced”).
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Second, probate lenders have suggested that they do not make
“loans” because they have no contractual right to demand reim-
bursement. In some states, “[t]he hallmark of a loan is the absolute
right to repayment.”297 As we explained in Probate Lending, this
safe harbor is indispensable for litigation lenders.298 The general
rule is that because litigation loans do not involve a “guarantee of
repayment,” they cannot be usurious.299 For example, in Kraft v.
Mason, the plaintiffs in an antitrust lawsuit assigned a generous
portion of their potential recovery to third parties in return for
$100,000.300 The plaintiffs then settled the antitrust case, but re-
fused to pay the lenders, claiming that the arrangement violated the
usury laws.301 A Florida appellate court disagreed, reasoning that
“[q]uite possibly, there would be no successful recovery from the
antitrust litigation,” and therefore the lenders could easily have lost
their entire investment.302
Similarly, probate lenders do not require heirs and beneficiaries
to repay a single penny of their advances. Indeed, companies
highlight the fact that they “shall have no recourse against [a bor-
rower] if the distribution ... is less than the [a]ssigned [a]mount.”303
Moreover, as one lender explained in its opposition to a section
297. Blackwell Ford, Inc. v. Calhoun, 555 N.W.2d 856, 859 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); see also
Bankers Mortg. Co. v. Comm’r, 142 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1944) (“The word ‘loan’ implies an
advance of money with an absolute promise to repay.”). Other jurisdictions factor the
“absolutely repayable” element into the black-letter test for usury, rather than the threshold
definition of whether an advance is a “loan.” See, e.g., Pearl Capital Rivis Ventures, LLC v.
RDN Const., Inc., 41 N.Y.S.3d 397, 400 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (“[T]here can be no usury unless the
principal sum is repayable absolutely.” (quoting Transmedia Rest. Co. v. 33 E. 61st St. Rest.
Corp., 710 N.Y.S.2d 756, 760 (Sup. Ct. 2000))). On the other hand, usury statutes in a few
states are broader. See, e.g., Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 400, 408 (Colo.
2015); Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 777 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that
usury under North Carolina law “does not require unconditional repayment of the principal”).
In these jurisdictions, probate loans likely fall under the usury laws without regard to
whether they are absolutely or contingently repayable.
298. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 146-55.
299. MoneyForLawsuits V LP v. Rowe, No. 10-cv-11537, 2012 WL 1068760, at *4 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 29, 2012), aff ’d sub nom. Money for Lawsuits V LP v. Rowe, 570 F. App’x 442 (6th
Cir. 2014); see also supra text accompanying notes 157-60.
300. 668 So. 2d 679, 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
301. See id. at 681-82.
302. Id. at 684.
303. Agreement for Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest, Assignment & Waiver of
Disclaimer Rights of Suanne M. Brady, supra note 210, at 2.
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11604.5 petition, many unexpected events can derail the probate
process:
Examples of such risks include, but are not limited to: Depart-
ment of Health Services [actions] to recover Medi-Cal payments;
quiet title actions against [e]state properties; claimants under
equitable adoption theories; family allowance claims; probate
homestead claims; subsequent testamentary instruments ...; will
contests; the real estate market; foreclosure sales; and a litany
of other situations.304
On paper, then, a probate lender’s recovery hinges on a contin-
gency: the estate remaining solvent as it passes through the court
system.
Nevertheless, the “contingency” exception to usury laws and the
TILA does not apply when the odds of the lender forfeiting its
advance are “remote.”305 Indeed, courts ignore “pretend[ ] contingen-
cies”306 and hold that “a mere colorable hazard” does not count.307
Thus, even litigation loans are not contingent if the plaintiff was
“nearly certain to be successful.”308 For example, in Echeverria v.
Estate of Lindner, the New York Supreme Court held that a liti-
gation loan made to a plaintiff in return for share of his worker’s
compensation lawsuit was usurious.309 Because the underlying sub-
stantive law all but guaranteed that the plaintiff would receive some
damages, the judge explained that “it is ludicrous to consider this
transaction anything else but a loan.”310
304. Matthews, Response, supra note 292, at 3. 
305. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 527 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1932).
306. Vee Bee Serv. Co. v. Household Fin. Corp., 51 N.Y.S.2d 590, 600 (Sup. Ct. 1944),
aff ’d, 55 N.Y.S.2d 570 (App. Div. 1945).
307. Olwine v. Torrens, 344 A.2d 665, 667 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).
308. Falconpoint Unlimited, LLC v. Senn, No. 14-cv-02342 NC, 2015 WL 5188811, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2015) (refusing to grant summary judgment in favor of litigation lender in
light of allegations that plaintiffs’ tort complaint was legally sound); see also Lawsuit Fin.,
L.L.C. v. Curry, 683 N.W.2d 233, 240 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (per curiam) (holding that
litigation loans were usurious where defendant had conceded liability and only the amount
of damages was uncertain); Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., No. 20523, 2001
WL 1339487, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2001) (“[T]he contracts were loans because no real
probability existed that non-payment would occur.”), aff ’d on other grounds, 789 N.E.2d 217
(Ohio 2003).
309. No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *1-2, *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005).
310. Id. at *9.
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Although the line between an authentic and an artificial contin-
gency is blurry, a close reading of the case law brings it into focus.
For one, in Oasis Legal Finance Group, LLC v. Coffman, the
Colorado Supreme Court held that a litigation loan triggered the
usury statute, in part, because of evidence that the company “fully
recover[ed]” the fronted funds “in eighty-five percent of cases.”311 As
noted, probate lenders enjoy an even higher success rate.312 In my
combined dataset, they collected (1) the entire amount of principal
and interest 97.5 percent of the time and (2) the principal and at
least some profit 98.3 percent of the time.313 In addition, judges
sometimes declare that the contingency exception only applies when
a creditor exposes itself to a probability of loss that is “over and
above the risk which exists with all loans ... that the borrower will
be unable to pay.”314 So what are the odds that a conventional lender
will lose money? During the period of my research, the following
transactions had higher default rates than probate loans: first
mortgages (between 3.7 percent and 5.6 percent), second mortgages
(between 2 percent and 4.6 percent), car loans (between 2 percent
and 2.75 percent), and credit cards (more than 9 percent).315 Thus,
probate loans are actually less hazardous for lenders than many
prosaic forms of credit. 
Examining the rare cases in which lenders lost money reinforces
this conclusion. The Arizona Supreme Court’s oft-cited opinion in
Britz v. Kinsvater can help frame this point.316 In that case, the state
justices announced that “a loan is ‘contingently’ repayable only if
the lender has—by the terms of the loan—subjected himself to some
greater hazard than that ... the security will depreciate.”317 With one
exception, the non-repaid loans ran into trouble precisely because
311. 361 P.3d 400, 408 (Colo. 2015). 
312. See supra Table 4.
313. See supra Table 4.
314. See Thomassen v. Carr, 58 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1967). 
315. See Floyd Norris, Default Rates Easing, Except on Credit Cards, N.Y. TIMES (May 21,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/22/business/economy/22charts.html [https://perma.cc/
6VEE-E7F9]; see also Frank Nothaft, Single-Family Mortgage Default Rate Falls to Pre-Reces-
sion Level, CORELOGIC (June 2, 2016), http://corelogic.com/blog/authors/frank-nothaft/ 2016/
06/single-family-mortgage-default-rate-falls-to-pre-recession-level.aspx#.WdbsXBNSz-Z
[https://perma.cc/G3VE-TVTY] (noting that the default rate on first mortgages was not lower
than 3 percent over the past decade).
316. 351 P.2d 986 (Ariz. 1960).
317. Id. at 990. 
2504 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2447
the company acquired an interest in property that declined in value.
Each contract was signed in late 2007 or early 2008 in an estate
that consisted entirely of real property.318 In 2009, as these cases
were percolating through the probate system, housing prices in
Alameda County fell by 42.6 percent.319 As a result, estates that
were once worth several hundred thousand dollars ended up barely
having enough funds to cover attorneys’ fees and creditors’ claims.320
This shared thread illustrates that only extraordinary events can
deny probate lenders a profit.321 But it also underscores the fact that
318. See Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5;
Proofs of Serv. at 4, In re Estate of Mouzon, No. RP07322619 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2008)
(DomainWeb); Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5;
Proofs of Serv. at 1, In re Estate of Reynolds, No. RP08371115 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2008)
(DomainWeb); Assignment of Interest in Estate & Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code
§ 11604.5, Exhibit A at 1, In re Estate of Rios, No. HP07327103 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 2007)
(DomainWeb) [hereinafter Assignment of Dec. 10, 2007]; Assignment of Interest in Estate &
Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code § 11604.5, Exhibit A at 1, In re Estate of Blakeney, No.
RP07336253 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2007) (DomainWeb); Assignment of Interest in Estate
& Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code § 11604.5, Exhibit A at 1, In re Estate of Blakeney, No.
RP07336253 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2007) (DomainWeb). The one case that did not fit this
mold involved the extraordinary circumstance of the decedent’s personal representative
stealing the estate assets and disappearing. See Final Distribution, Alameda Cty. Prob.
Exam’r’s Checklist at 1, In re Estate of Littleton, No. RP07-329280 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 18,
2009) (DomainWeb).
319. Jay Barmann, SF Home Prices Fall 20%; Overall Bay Area Prices Fall 46%, SFIST
(Apr. 17, 2009, 3:48 PM), http://sfist.com/2009/04/17/sf_home_prices_fall_20_overall_bay.php
[https://perma.cc/V7HG-GAM5].
320. Compare Petition for Letters of Admin. at 2, In re Estate of Reynolds, No. RP08
371115 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2008) (DomainWeb) [hereinafter Reynolds, Petition for Let-
ters] (valuing the decedent’s house at $249,000), and Inventory & Appraisal at attach. 2,
Estate of Blakeney, No. RP07336253 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2007) (DomainWeb) (valuing
the decedent’s real property at $380,000), with Order Settling First & Final Account of Adm’r,
Granting Petition re Payment of Debts, Petition for Distribution of Insolvent Estate, Petition
for Statutory and Extraordinary Fees to Adm’r & Attorney at 4-6, In re Estate of Reynolds,
No. RP08371115 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 6, 2010) (DomainWeb) (distributing less than $70,000),
and First & Final Report of Adm’rs, Petition for Order Approving Report for Statutory Fees,
for Extraordinary Fees, & for Final Distribution at 4, In re Estate of Blakeney, No. RP
07336253 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2010) (DomainWeb) (noting that the personal repre-
sentative only received about $90,000 for the sale of the decedent’s real property). For another
case in which a lender did not recover the full amount of its advance, see supra text accom-
panying notes 232-40.
321. We speculated in Probate Lending that the timing of the loan might impact the risk
of nonpayment. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 143. Specifically, we observed
that in two of the three cases in which lenders lost money, the companies had entered into
loans before the personal representative filed the Inventory and Appraisal (the “I&A,” which
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the contingencies to which probate lenders expose themselves are
not unique; rather, they are endemic in lending.322 For these rea-
sons, probate loans do not qualify for the contingency exception to
usury laws and the TILA.323
Extending these consumer protection principles to probate loans
would push the industry in the right direction. For example, the
TILA would force probate lenders to be more transparent about the
size of their markups. Regulation Z, which implements the statute,
requires creditors to provide estimates of likely APRs.324 Under this
rubric, probate lenders would need to disclose their calculations
is a detailed summary of the decedent’s property). See id. Thus, we argued that these lenders
might have suffered the consequences of jumping the gun and discovering that the estate was
worth less than they believed. See id. However, as Professor Kidd points out, we did not exam-
ine how often loans that were fully repaid also involved pre-I&A loans. See Kidd, Response,
supra note 25, at 8. This is a fair point. Thus, for this Article, I investigated the issue and
found that pre-I&A loans occurred in 45 cases (49 percent). One reason why the I&A may be
less relevant than we thought is that the initial petition for probate also has to include a
statement about the value of the decedent’s property. See, e.g., Reynolds, Petition for Letters,
supra note 320, attach. 1. Accordingly, it appears that a sharp decline in real property value—
and not premature lending—is the common denominator in troublesome loans. 
322. Some courts describe the contingency exception as a usury-specific doctrine that
hinges on whether the lender’s profit “is wholly or partially put in hazard.” WRI Opportunity
Loans II LLC v. Cooper, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 212 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Lamb v. Herndon,
275 P. 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929)); see also Lamb v. Herndon, 275 P. 503, 507 (Cal. Ct. App.
1929) (describing this as the interest contingency exception). Probate lenders might also try
to invoke this exception by arguing that it is theoretically possible a case will take so long to
conclude that the effective APR on the loan will be less than the maximum permissible
amount. Cf. Matthews, Response, supra note 292, at 2-3 (noting that the lender “cannot
control when [e]state distributions are made” (emphasis added)). Again, though, this is an
improbable outcome. For example, in only one loan that was at least partially repaid did the
APR dip below California’s 10 percent usury threshold. See supra Part II.B.3.
323. An unpublished opinion from the Southern District of California has held that the
TILA does not apply to probate loans. In Reed v. Val-Chris Investments, Inc., the plaintiff
accepted $35,000 in return for pledging $50,000 of his father’s estate to AI. No. 11cv371 BEN
(WMC), 2011 WL 6028001, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2011). He then sought to rescind the deal,
arguing that AI had not complied with the TILA’s disclosure mandates. Id. at *2. The judge
dismissed this claim, reasoning that the transaction between the plaintiff and AI was non-
recourse. Id. Reed ’s holding makes sense in the absence of proof about repayment rates, but
my study provides this missing variable and, thus, changes the calculus. As with usury laws,
courts must “look[ ] past the form of the transactions to their economic substance in deciding
whether the [TILA] applie[s].” Burnett v. Ala Moana Pawn Shop, 3 F.3d 1261, 1262 (9th Cir.
1993). Even if lenders do not mandate that heirs and beneficiaries return their advances, the
brute truth is that lenders recoup the principal more than 98 percent of the time. See supra
Part II.B.3.
324. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(c)(2)(i) (2017). 
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about how long a case will persist in the court system.325 This
additional information would allow borrowers to compare their
options and make educated choices, facilitating competition and
driving down prices. Likewise, probate lenders would need to add
usury savings clauses to their loans. These provisions serve as a
safety valve by automatically reducing the APR on an illegal loan to
the maximum permissible rate.326 Although usary savings clauses
would make the business less profitable, it would also assuage con-
cerns that probate loans are unfair.
C. Unconscionability
Finally, courts could also consider whether probate loans are
unconscionable. This defense to contract enforcement, which we did
not mention in Probate Lending, can fill gaps in states that neither
have legislation on point nor effective usury laws.
Unconscionability has two prongs: procedural and substantive.
Procedural unconscionability hinges on the contract formation pro-
cess.327 It is a holistic test that considers disparity in bargaining
power, whether the nondrafting party was sophisticated or had the
ability to negotiate key terms, and the physical appearance of the
contract.328 Substantive unconscionability focuses on the fairness of
325. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at 154. 
326. See, e.g., Smith v. Miller (In re Dominguez), 995 F.2d 883, 885-86 (9th Cir. 1993);
Saypo Cattle Co. v. RMF Deep Creek, LLC, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1282 (D. Mont. 2012); Jer-
sey Palm-Gross, Inc. v. Paper, 639 So. 2d 664, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), aff ’d, 658 So.2d
531 (Fla. 1995); First State Bank v. Dorst, 843 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. App. 1992); cf. Arneill
Ranch v. Petit, 134 Cal. Rptr. 456, 467 (Ct. App. 1976) (observing that a provision in a note
limiting interest to the highest permissible rate might be enforceable). Admittedly, other ju-
risdictions do not enforce usury savings clauses. See, e.g., Swindell v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n,
409 S.E.2d 892, 896 (N.C. 1991); NV One, LLC v. Potomac Realty Capital, LLC, 84 A.3d 800,
810 (R.I. 2014). For more about these terms, see Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 22, at
145-46.
327. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967) (dividing unconscionability famously into two spheres and
defining the procedural aspect as “bargaining naughtiness”).
328. See, e.g., Whitney v. Alltel Commc’ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)
(finding an agreement to be procedurally unconscionable because it was sent “in the mail on
a take it or leave it basis”); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 925 (N.D.
2005) (opining that if “the only option presented to the other party is to take it or leave it,
some quantum of procedural unconscionability is established”); cf. Honig v. Comcast of Ga.
I, LLC, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1285 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (evaluating the “age, education, intel-
ligence, business acumen and experience of the parties” (quoting NEC Techs., Inc. v. Nelson,
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the challenged provision.329 It applies to clauses that are “overly
harsh,”330 “unduly oppressive,”331 or “so one-sided as to shock the con-
science.”332 Most states employ a sliding scale and permit strong evi-
dence of one element to compensate for a weak showing on the
other.333
There is little authority on whether fringe lending is unconscion-
able. In James v. National Finance, LLC, a hotel housekeeper who
“needed money for food and rent” took out a $200 payday loan with
an APR of more than 800 percent.334 The Delaware Chancery
Court—not a bench with a liberal reputation—refused to enforce the
agreement.335 The court observed that there is “a strong American
tradition of freedom of contract, and that tradition is especially
strong in our [s]tate, which prides itself on having commercial laws
that are efficient.”336 Nevertheless, the court held that the loan was
procedurally unconscionable, reasoning that the borrower was not
financially savvy and had no opportunity to haggle for better
terms.337 In addition, the court observed that the instrument used
“inconsistent language” to describe key concepts, which “could easily
confuse an unsophisticated customer.”338 Finally, the court cited the
478 S.E.2d 769, 771-72 (Ga. 1996))).
329. See, e.g., Ruppelt v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC, 293 P.3d 902, 906 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2012). 
330. Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 367 P.3d 6, 11 (Cal. 2016) (quoting Sonic-Calabasas A,
Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184 (Cal. 2013)).
331. State ex rel. Richmond Am. Homes of W. Va., Inc. v. Sanders, 717 S.E.2d 909, 922 (W.
Va. 2011).
332. Davis v. O’Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Soltani v.
W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2001)).
333. See, e.g., Sprague v. Household Int’l, 473 F. Supp. 2d 966, 971-72 (W.D. Mo. 2005);
Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 350 (Ct. App. 2007); MS Credit Ctr., Inc.
v. Horton, 926 So. 2d 167, 177 (Miss. 2006); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159, 1162
(Nev. 2004) (per curiam); Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 922-23 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 2002); State v. Wolowitz, 468 N.Y.S.2d 131, 145 (App. Div. 1983); Tillman v.
Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 370 (N.C. 2008); Woodhaven Apartments v.
Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah 1997), abrogated by Commercial Real Estate Inv., L.C.
v. Comcast of Utah II, Inc., 285 P.3d 1193 (Utah 2012); Roussalis v. Wyo. Med. Ctr., Inc., 4
P.3d 209, 246-47 (Wyo. 2000).
334. 132 A.3d 799, 805, 807 (Del. Ch. 2016).
335. See id. at 839.
336. Id. at 812 (quoting Abry P’rs V, L.P. v. F & W Acq. LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1059-60 (Del.
Ch. 2006)).
337. Id. at 828-34.
338. Id. at 823.
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loan’s skyscraping APR to hold that it was substantively deficient,
observing that “[n]o one would borrow rationally on the terms it
contemplated unless that person was delusional, mistaken ..., or
under economic duress.”339
Conversely, in In re Pierson, a federal court in Ohio rejected an
unconscionability challenge to a pension loan.340 In return for
$28,810, Stephen Pierson promised to pay Structured Investments
Company, LLC $849 every month for eight years, for a total of
$81,504.341 The judge held that the loan was not procedurally uncon-
scionable, noting that Pierson had initialed next to harsh terms.342
In addition, the court held that the agreement was not substantively
unconscionable because Pierson had used the proceeds for home
improvements and debt consolidations, rather than necessities.343 
Gauged by these yardsticks, some probate loans might be pro-
cedurally unconscionable. Although it is not clear whether consum-
ers are able to negotiate the amount of the company’s markup, the
remainder of the agreement often consists of preprinted text. In
addition, because probate loans address two complex, legalistic mat-
ters—credit and probate—they are dense and difficult to under-
stand. Most of them allow lenders to demand the sale of estate
property, waive the borrower’s disclaimer rights, and address the
impact of the borrower filing for bankruptcy.344 Moreover, like the
payday loan in James, some of the key terms are presented in ways
that seem designed to “divert ... attention from the problems raised
by them or the rights given up through them.”345 For example, Key-
National Funding’s contract misleadingly implies that a borrower’s
“[t]otal [c]osts and [f]ees” are zero, when, in fact, the company
charges a markup of several thousand dollars.346 Likewise, buried
339. Id. at 837; see also State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 329 P.3d 658, 674 (N.M.
2014) (invalidating a payday loan and reasoning that “[i]t is contrary to our public policy, and
therefore unconscionable as a matter of law, for these historically anomalous interest rates
to be charged in our state”).
340. 447 B.R. 840, 851 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2011).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 850.
343. See id. at 851.
344. See, e.g., Von Roderick Passmore’s Assignment #1, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial
Interest in Decedent’s Estate to Inheritance Funding Co., Inc., supra note 195, at 2.
345. See James v. Nat’l Fin., LLC, 132 A.3d 799, 824 (Del. Ch. 2016) (quoting Fritz v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1369, 1990 WL 186448, at *4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 1990)).
346. See, e.g., Second Agreement for Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest, Assignment,
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in the boilerplate of HAC’s agreement is a provision that imposes a
nonrefundable $500 “processing fee.”347 Thus, some probate loans
may be procedurally unconscionable.
But other aspects of probate loans cut the other way. The average
length of these contracts is just five pages.348 In addition, one lender
asks borrowers to authenticate the bottom of every sheet of paper.349
Although this might not be as powerful as the evidence in Pierson
that the consumer “meticulously initial[ed] ... most of what could be
considered the contract’s more onerous terms,”350 it still might dispel
any procedural infirmity. Similarly, in some jurisdictions, “[a]n
agreement is not procedurally unconscionable if there is a meaning-
ful opportunity to opt out.”351 Another company gave borrowers a
three-day “cooling off ” period in which they could change their
minds and cancel the transaction.352 These factors might tip the
scales away from procedural unconscionability.
Substantive unconscionability will also vary from case to case. In
general, an “exorbitant price” can elucidate that “one party has in
fact been imposed upon by another party in an inequitable or
unconscionable manner.”353 One decision suggests that the high
markup on a probate loan might be unduly harsh. In In re Estate of
Simpson, the decedent died because of his nursing home’s alleged
negligence.354 His son, acting as personal representative of the es-
tate, settled the case and then sought judicial approval of his de-
cision.355 However, the son had also taken out a probate loan in his
capacity as an heir.356 The New York Surrogate Court noted that
this deal raised a fluorescent red flag and requested further brief-
ing:
& Waiver of Disclaimer Rights of Catherine L. Sanders, supra note 291, at 1.
347. See, e.g., Agreement of Corinne Coleman at 7, In re Estate of Coleman, No. HP0842
4996 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 2013) (DomainWeb).
348. See, e.g., Assignment of Dec. 10, 2007, supra note 318.
349. See, e.g., Second Agreement for Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest, Assignment &
Waiver of Disclaimer Rights of Catherine L. Sanders, supra note 291, at 1-7.
350. See In re Pierson, 447 B.R. 840, 850 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2011) (emphasis added).
351. Mumin v. Uber Techs., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 3d 507, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).
352. See, e.g., Agreement of Kristina M. Chubbuck, supra note 4, at 5.
353. 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:15 (4th ed. 2010).
354. No. 2910-A/2006/A, 2008 WL 4925828, at *1 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Nov. 19, 2008).
355. See id.
356. Id.
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[N]otwithstanding that the court does not want to prejudge any
issues, the transaction does at least raise a question with respect
to whether the agreement might be unenforceable on the alter-
native grounds that it is unconscionable .... Specifically, the
troublesome facts are that ... the [lender] paid $7,990 to the peti-
tioner, and in consideration thereof, the petitioner agreed to pay
to the [lender] either $11,900 or $13,300 depending upon
whether or not the payment was made within six months of the
advance.357
My data bear out Simpson’s intuition that probate loans can be
quite one-sided.358 Recall that James held that an 800 percent APR
on a $200 advance was an “obvious indication[ ] of unfairness” that
“shocks the conscience.”359 Likewise, even fringe lending apologists
concede that “it would seem irrational for any consumer to borrow
money at an interest rate exceeding 400% under any circum-
stance.”360 Although probate loans are for thousands of dollars—far
more than payday loans—I uncovered transactions with APRs of
499 percent,361 541 percent,362 547 percent,363 640 percent,364 649 per-
357. Id. Unfortunately, the paper trail ends here. I cannot determine whether anyone filed
the requested briefing or if the judge revisited the issue.
358. See supra Table 1.
359. See James v. Nat’l Fin., LLC, 132 A.3d 799, 816 (Del. Ch. 2016).
360. Id. (quoting Edward C. Lawrence & Gregory Elliehausen, A Comparative Analysis of
Payday Loan Customers, 26 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 299, 299 n.1 (2008)).
361. See, e.g., Assignment of Interest in Estate & Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code
§ 11604.5 Exhibit A at 1, In re Estate of Gaxiola, No. RP07334581 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 22,
2009) (DomainWeb).
362. Agreement Regarding Assignment of Beneficiary’s Interest at 1-2, In re Estate of
Manos, No. RP07318864 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2008) (DomainWeb).
363. See Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5;
Proof of Serv. at 1, In re Estate of Bell, No. RP08389640 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 2010)
(DomainWeb).
364. See Third Assignment of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate; Declaration of
Compliance: Proof of Serv. at 1, In re Estate of Dennis, No. RP08386711 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar.
1, 2013) (DomainWeb).
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cent,365 676 percent,366 730 percent,367 857 percent,368 913 percent,369
and 930 percent.370 These markups “are so extreme as to suggest
fundamental unfairness,”371 and should be substantively unconscio-
nable.
To conclude, unconscionability can be a fallback challenge to
extortionate probate loans. Some of these arrangements are both
procedurally and substantively suspect, and should be unenforce-
able even in states that have no other applicable consumer protec-
tion measures.
CONCLUSION
Probate loans have become a player on the fringe finance scene.
But unlike RALs, payday loans, and pension loans, probate loans
have been all but ignored. This Article provides empirical evidence
365. See Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5;
Proof of Serv. at 1, In re Estate of Bell, No. RP08389640 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2010)
(DomainWeb).
366. Agreement Regarding Assignment of Beneficiary’s Interest at 1-2, In re Estate of
Manos, No. RP07318864 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 2007) (DomainWeb).
367. See Assignment of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate, In re Estate of Bell at 1,
No. RP08389640 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2010) (DomainWeb).
368. See Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s
Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights, supra note 203, at 1.
369. See Sixth Agreement of Kristina M. Chubbuck, supra note 6, at 1.
370. In fact, one estate featured two such loans. See Assignment Agreement, Sale & Trans-
fer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate/Waiver of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration
Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5; Proof of Serv. at 1, In re Estate of Flemming, No.
RP08390868 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2009) (DomainWeb) (agreement of Alonzo Wilkes);
Assignment Agreement, Sale & Transfer of Beneficial Interest in Decedent’s Estate/Waiver
of Disclaimer Rights; Declaration Pursuant to Prob. Code Section 11604.5; Proof of Serv. at
1, In re Estate of Flemming, No. RP08390868 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2009) (DomainWeb)
(agreement of Nina Wilkes).
371. See James v. Nat’l Fin., LLC, 132 A.3d 799, 821 (Del. Ch. 2016). In addition, substan-
tive unconscionability might revolve around what the heir or beneficiary did with the funds.
As noted, James relied on the fact that the borrower “obtained the Disputed Loan because she
needed money for groceries and rent.” Id. at 831. Conversely, Pierson found it meaningful that
the retiree did not enter into the transaction “to obtain basic necessities, but rather out of a
desire to make home improvements and to consolidate his debts.” In re Pierson, 447 B.R. 840,
850 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2011). As noted supra text accompanying notes 275-76, more research
is required to determine how the recipients of probate loans use the proceeds. It does seem
slightly perverse, however, to penalize lenders for providing funds to help cash-strapped
borrowers survive lean times. That seems backwards: arguably, the fact that fringe lending
can bridge the gaps between paychecks suggests that it is socially valuable.
2512 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2447
about the industry. It contends that California should sharpen the
bite of its probate lending statute and other states should consider
passing similar laws. It also urges courts to recognize that probate
loans must comply with usury laws, the TILA, and the unconsciona-
bility doctrine. As the largest posthumous wealth transfer in history
unfolds,372 a rising number of consumers will cash in early on their
inheritances. The legal system should ensure that they do so in a
transparent and fair fashion.
372. See supra text accompanying note 21.
